I broadly agree with all of Sami’s points. However, on this terminological issue I think it is a bit less clear cut. It is true that many decision theorists distinguish between “dutch books” and “money pumps” in the way you are suggesting, and it seems like this is becoming the standard terminology in philosophy. That said, there are definitely some decision theorists that use “Dutch book arguments” to refer to money pump arguments for VNM axioms. For example, Yaari writes that “an agent that violates Expected Utility Theory is vulnerable to a so-called Dutch book”.
Now, given that the entry is called “dutch book theorems” and mostly focuses on probabilism, Sami is still right to point out that it is confusing to say that these arguments support EUT. Maybe I would have put this under “misleading” rather than under “false” though.
I broadly agree with all of Sami’s points. However, on this terminological issue I think it is a bit less clear cut. It is true that many decision theorists distinguish between “dutch books” and “money pumps” in the way you are suggesting, and it seems like this is becoming the standard terminology in philosophy. That said, there are definitely some decision theorists that use “Dutch book arguments” to refer to money pump arguments for VNM axioms. For example, Yaari writes that “an agent that violates Expected Utility Theory is vulnerable to a so-called Dutch book”.
Now, given that the entry is called “dutch book theorems” and mostly focuses on probabilism, Sami is still right to point out that it is confusing to say that these arguments support EUT. Maybe I would have put this under “misleading” rather than under “false” though.