There are no truly one-shot problems. Most humans develop precommitment habits and elevate some of them into their moral code in some abstracted way (a wetware version of self-modification). Some examples are: do not kill/steal/covet/deceive. The Parfit’s Hitchhiker is only an issue because the relevant moral injunction is pretty weak. if you modify the problem statement in terms of the stronger moral injunctions, the problem would disappear.
Reputation can be modeled as the idea that you have another ‘resource’ - that something like the number of promises you’ve made and the number you’ve kept (and their importance) is public knowledge.
When reputation is incorporated, agents compare the value of the $100 against the value of the reputation lost by doing so.
The problem could be easily changed to include ‘and you will lose no reputation, because no one thinks the driver is asking for a reasonable amount’ or ‘and you have p chance of losing r reputation worth u dollars’.
The need to protect your reputation provides an incentive not to defect once you’re in town.
We’re considering a one-shot problem.
There are no truly one-shot problems. Most humans develop precommitment habits and elevate some of them into their moral code in some abstracted way (a wetware version of self-modification). Some examples are: do not kill/steal/covet/deceive. The Parfit’s Hitchhiker is only an issue because the relevant moral injunction is pretty weak. if you modify the problem statement in terms of the stronger moral injunctions, the problem would disappear.
Surely there are situations where you meet someone and you have 0.001% chance of ever meeting them again, et.
Yes, plenty! My point was that meeting that someone belongs to a reference class of situations you had encountered before and will encounter again.
Reputation can be modeled as the idea that you have another ‘resource’ - that something like the number of promises you’ve made and the number you’ve kept (and their importance) is public knowledge.
When reputation is incorporated, agents compare the value of the $100 against the value of the reputation lost by doing so.
The problem could be easily changed to include ‘and you will lose no reputation, because no one thinks the driver is asking for a reasonable amount’ or ‘and you have p chance of losing r reputation worth u dollars’.