It’s relevant because it determines whether the question matters.
Then it seems clear to me that the question shouldn’t matter to you. Objectivists may be interventionists at a higher rate than relativists, but that bears no relation to which position is true.
No, not wrong. But having a different set of consequences.
That set of consequences being unpreferred, presumably. What is that if not an expression of (relative) wrongness?
Not wrongness as a property of the wine no. But given knowledge of my preference and all else being equal, would it not be wrong to give me white over red?
Then it seems clear to me that the question shouldn’t matter to you. Objectivists may be interventionists at a higher rate than relativists, but that bears no relation to which position is true.
That set of consequences being unpreferred, presumably. What is that if not an expression of (relative) wrongness?
If you prefer red wine over white, that is not an expression of white wine’s wrongness.
Not wrongness as a property of the wine no. But given knowledge of my preference and all else being equal, would it not be wrong to give me white over red?
You are mixing up two meanings of wrong:
morally wrong (approximately = evil)
not suited to
Serving white wine with steak might well be wrong in the not appropriate sense, but it is not wrong in the moral sense.
No. I assert that it would be (mildly) evil of you to give me white wine, given knowledge of my preference for red and equal availability.
It might be under certain moral systems. It’s probably not under other moral systems. It almost certainly depends a lot on the context.