No, in the sense that it directly applies to all types of knowledge (which any epistemology applies to—which i think is all of them, but that doesn’t matter to universality).
Perhaps I don’t understand some nuance of what you mean here. If you can explain it or link to something that explains this in detail I will read it.
But to respond to what I think you mean… If you have a method that can be applied to all types of knowledge, that implies that it is Turing complete; it is therefore equivalent in capability to other Turing complete systems; that also means it is susceptible to the infinite regresses you dislike in “justificationist epistemologies”… i.e. the halting problem.
Also, just because it can be applied to all types of knowledge does not mean it is the best choice for all types of knowledge, or for all types of operations on that knowledge.
I think the basic way we differ is you have despaired of philosophy getting anywhere, and you’re trying to get rigor from math. But Popper saved philosophy. (And most people didn’t notice.) Example:
I would not describe my perspective that way; you may have forgotten that I am a third party in this argument. I think that there is a lot of historical junk in philosophy and that it is continuing to produce a lot junk—Popper didn’t fix this and neither will Bayesianism, it is more of a people problem—but philosophy has also produced and is producing a lot of interesting and good ideas.
I think one way we differ is that you see a distinct difference between math and philosophy and I see a wide gradient of abstractions for manipulating information. Another is that you think that there is something special about Popper’s approach that allows it to rise above all other approaches in all cases, and I think that there are many approaches and that it is best to choose the approach based on the context.
With this you could start to answer questions like “Why is X moral in the UK but not in Saudi Arabia?”
You have very limited ambitious. You’re trying to focus on small questions b/c you think bigger ones like: what is moral objectively? are too hard and, since you math won’t answer them, it’s hopeless.
This was a response to your request for an example; you read too much into it to assume it implies anything about my ambitions.
A question like “what is moral objectively?” is easy. Nothing is “moral objectively”. Meaning is created within contexts of assessment; if you want to know if something is “moral” you must consider that question with a context that will perform the classification. Not all contexts will produce the same result and not all contexts will even support a meaning for the concept of “moral”.
But to respond to what I think you mean… If you have a method that can be applied to all types of knowledge, that implies that it is Turing complete; it is therefore equivalent in capability to other Turing complete systems;
Minor nitpick at least capable of modeling any Turing machine, not Turing complete. For example, something that had access to some form of halting oracle would be able to do more than a Turing machine.
Perhaps I don’t understand some nuance of what you mean here. If you can explain it or link to something that explains this in detail I will read it.
But to respond to what I think you mean… If you have a method that can be applied to all types of knowledge, that implies that it is Turing complete; it is therefore equivalent in capability to other Turing complete systems; that also means it is susceptible to the infinite regresses you dislike in “justificationist epistemologies”… i.e. the halting problem.
Also, just because it can be applied to all types of knowledge does not mean it is the best choice for all types of knowledge, or for all types of operations on that knowledge.
I would not describe my perspective that way; you may have forgotten that I am a third party in this argument. I think that there is a lot of historical junk in philosophy and that it is continuing to produce a lot junk—Popper didn’t fix this and neither will Bayesianism, it is more of a people problem—but philosophy has also produced and is producing a lot of interesting and good ideas.
I think one way we differ is that you see a distinct difference between math and philosophy and I see a wide gradient of abstractions for manipulating information. Another is that you think that there is something special about Popper’s approach that allows it to rise above all other approaches in all cases, and I think that there are many approaches and that it is best to choose the approach based on the context.
This was a response to your request for an example; you read too much into it to assume it implies anything about my ambitions.
A question like “what is moral objectively?” is easy. Nothing is “moral objectively”. Meaning is created within contexts of assessment; if you want to know if something is “moral” you must consider that question with a context that will perform the classification. Not all contexts will produce the same result and not all contexts will even support a meaning for the concept of “moral”.
Minor nitpick at least capable of modeling any Turing machine, not Turing complete. For example, something that had access to some form of halting oracle would be able to do more than a Turing machine.