How does that reinforce Robin’s model? It goes against it if anything. Imagine if humans, dolphins, bats, bears, and penguins nearly simultaneously developed language on separate continents. It would be a major unexplained WTF.
You can start here, but Wikipedia has pretty bad coverage of that.
Robin’s model makes more sense if we think of it as “some process we don’t understand is behind all these repeated patterns”. If agriculture indeed arises at a specific point for reasons we don’t understand, it makes Robin’s model more likely—and it makes it harder for us to counterfactually mess with the data.
I think a good steel-man version of Robin’s model would start with a discussion of universality. I think I recall Robin having some thoughts along such lines, but I don’t know Kurweil well enough to know whether he invokes such things.
That wouldn’t make Robin’s model more counterfactually resilient—it would just provide more evidence for the model, thus pitting our understanding of universality directly against our understanding of history, evolution, economics, etc...
I’m not quite sure what you’re saying, but I think I agree with this. I guess I’m trying to flesh out the idea of “some process we don’t understand”, since Robin’s model seems to depend on it (as do things like Moore’s law, which is more strongly supported by the data).
If we do assume universality, counterfactual resiliency is still a useful method of analysis, and we can even further clarify the reasons why by pointing out that models of universal behaviour usually involve the aggregation of many small, mostly independent effects. However, some evidence against counterfactual resilience is weakened. For example, we could take the counterfactual that the Greeks had an industrial revolution, but we might not actually know how plausible that is. Models like Robin’s that conjecture universality would predict that there were reasons that that couldn’t have happened, so we need to be more familiar with the data before a claimed instance of nonresilience can really be considered good evidence against the model. Thus, the idea of universality allows us to more accurately evaluate the strength of arguments of this sort.
I think I agree with you—what I’m saying is that if we had evidence for universality or for Robin’s model, and we also had evidence that the Greek (or Chinese) industrial revolutions could have happened early, then we can now pit these two sources of evidence directly against each other...
How does that reinforce Robin’s model? It goes against it if anything. Imagine if humans, dolphins, bats, bears, and penguins nearly simultaneously developed language on separate continents. It would be a major unexplained WTF.
You can start here, but Wikipedia has pretty bad coverage of that.
Robin’s model makes more sense if we think of it as “some process we don’t understand is behind all these repeated patterns”. If agriculture indeed arises at a specific point for reasons we don’t understand, it makes Robin’s model more likely—and it makes it harder for us to counterfactually mess with the data.
I think a good steel-man version of Robin’s model would start with a discussion of universality. I think I recall Robin having some thoughts along such lines, but I don’t know Kurweil well enough to know whether he invokes such things.
That wouldn’t make Robin’s model more counterfactually resilient—it would just provide more evidence for the model, thus pitting our understanding of universality directly against our understanding of history, evolution, economics, etc...
I’m not quite sure what you’re saying, but I think I agree with this. I guess I’m trying to flesh out the idea of “some process we don’t understand”, since Robin’s model seems to depend on it (as do things like Moore’s law, which is more strongly supported by the data).
If we do assume universality, counterfactual resiliency is still a useful method of analysis, and we can even further clarify the reasons why by pointing out that models of universal behaviour usually involve the aggregation of many small, mostly independent effects. However, some evidence against counterfactual resilience is weakened. For example, we could take the counterfactual that the Greeks had an industrial revolution, but we might not actually know how plausible that is. Models like Robin’s that conjecture universality would predict that there were reasons that that couldn’t have happened, so we need to be more familiar with the data before a claimed instance of nonresilience can really be considered good evidence against the model. Thus, the idea of universality allows us to more accurately evaluate the strength of arguments of this sort.
I think I agree with you—what I’m saying is that if we had evidence for universality or for Robin’s model, and we also had evidence that the Greek (or Chinese) industrial revolutions could have happened early, then we can now pit these two sources of evidence directly against each other...