You would care if certain objects are destructively teleported but not care if the same happens to you (and presumably other humans)
Is this a preference you would want to want?
I mean, given the ability to self-modify, would you rather keep putting (negative) value on concepts like “copy of” even when there’s no practical physical difference?
Note that this doesn’t mean no longer caring about causal history. (you care about your own casual history in the form of memories and such)
Also, can you trace where this preference is coming from?
You would care if certain objects are destructively teleported but not care if the same happens to you (and presumably other humans)
Yeah, I would use a teleporter any time if it was safe. But I would only pay a fraction for certain artifacts that were teleported.
Is this a preference you would want to want? I mean, given the ability to self-modify, would you rather keep putting (negative) value on concepts like “copy of” even when there’s no practical physical difference?
I would keep that preference. And there is a difference. All the effort it took to relocate an object adds to its overall value. If only for the fact that other people who share my values, or play the same game and therefore play by the same rules, will desire the object even more.
Also, can you trace where this preference is coming from?
Part of the value of touching an asteroid from Mars is the knowledge of its spacetime trajectory. An atomically identical copy of a rock from Mars that was digitally transmitted by a robot probe printed out for me by my molecular assembler is very different. It is also a rock from Mars but its spacetime trajectory is different, it is artificial.
Which is similar to drinking Champagne and sparkling wine that tastes exactly the same. The first is valued because while drinking it I am aware of its spacetime trajectory, the resources it took to create it and where it originally came from and how it got here.
If only for the fact that other people who share my values, or play the same game and therefore play by the same rules, will desire the object even more.
How about if there were two worlds—one where they care about whether a spacetime trajectory does or does not go through a destroy-rebuild cycle, and one where they spend the effort on other things they value. In that case, in which world would you rather live in?
The Champagne example helps, I can understand putting value on effort for attainment, but I’d like another clarification:
If you have two rocks where rock 1 is brought from mars via spaceship, and rock 2 is the same as rock 1 only after receiving it you teleport it 1 meter to the right. Would you value rock 2 less than rock 1? If yes, why would you care about that but not about yourself undergoing the same?
How about if there were two worlds—one where they care about whether a spacetime trajectory does or does not go through a destroy-rebuild cycle, and one where they spend the effort on other things they value. In that case, in which world would you rather live in?
It is not that important. I would trade that preference for more important qualities. But that line of reasoning can also lead to the destruction of all complex values. I have to draw a line somewhere or end up solely maximizing the quality that is most important.
If you have two rocks where rock 1 is brought from mars via spaceship, and rock 2 is the same as rock 1 only after receiving it you teleport it 1 meter to the right. Would you value rock 2 less than rock 1?
Rock 1 and 2 would be of almost equal value to me.
In a hypothetical case where you werent oposed to slave trade… what’d you pay for a transported slave very much like yourself? would it matter if you had been transported?
If the slave had some famous causal history, would it matter if it was mental (composed an important song) or physical (lone survivor of a disaster)?
You would care if certain objects are destructively teleported but not care if the same happens to you (and presumably other humans)
Is this a preference you would want to want? I mean, given the ability to self-modify, would you rather keep putting (negative) value on concepts like “copy of” even when there’s no practical physical difference? Note that this doesn’t mean no longer caring about causal history. (you care about your own casual history in the form of memories and such)
Also, can you trace where this preference is coming from?
Yeah, I would use a teleporter any time if it was safe. But I would only pay a fraction for certain artifacts that were teleported.
I would keep that preference. And there is a difference. All the effort it took to relocate an object adds to its overall value. If only for the fact that other people who share my values, or play the same game and therefore play by the same rules, will desire the object even more.
Part of the value of touching an asteroid from Mars is the knowledge of its spacetime trajectory. An atomically identical copy of a rock from Mars that was digitally transmitted by a robot probe printed out for me by my molecular assembler is very different. It is also a rock from Mars but its spacetime trajectory is different, it is artificial.
Which is similar to drinking Champagne and sparkling wine that tastes exactly the same. The first is valued because while drinking it I am aware of its spacetime trajectory, the resources it took to create it and where it originally came from and how it got here.
How about if there were two worlds—one where they care about whether a spacetime trajectory does or does not go through a destroy-rebuild cycle, and one where they spend the effort on other things they value. In that case, in which world would you rather live in?
The Champagne example helps, I can understand putting value on effort for attainment, but I’d like another clarification:
If you have two rocks where rock 1 is brought from mars via spaceship, and rock 2 is the same as rock 1 only after receiving it you teleport it 1 meter to the right. Would you value rock 2 less than rock 1? If yes, why would you care about that but not about yourself undergoing the same?
It is not that important. I would trade that preference for more important qualities. But that line of reasoning can also lead to the destruction of all complex values. I have to draw a line somewhere or end up solely maximizing the quality that is most important.
Rock 1 and 2 would be of almost equal value to me.
In a hypothetical case where you werent oposed to slave trade… what’d you pay for a transported slave very much like yourself? would it matter if you had been transported?
If the slave had some famous causal history, would it matter if it was mental (composed an important song) or physical (lone survivor of a disaster)?
So the labour theory of value is true for art?