I disagree with the premise that humans are utility monsters, but I see what you are getting at.
I’m a little weary of the concept of a utility monster as it is easy to imagine and debate but I don’t think it is immediately realistic.
I want my considerations of utility to be aware of possible future outcomes. If we imagine a concrete scenario like Zach’s fantastic slave pyramid builders for an increasingly happy man, it seems obvious that there is something psychotic about an individual who could be made more happy by the senseless toil of other conscious beings. That is not the desired outcome of implementing their naive ‘utilitarian ethics computer’ genie.
I agree that that situation is repugnant. I think this is created from a poor implementation of their ‘utilitarian ethics computer’.
Here’s why humans in general are not repugnant:
We are not using the suffering of others to increase solely our own happiness. At least not directly, deliberately and relentlessly.
I do agree that sometimes the life-satisfaction of squirrels is cut short by humans building dams (to follow your example).
Sometimes this could be morally right, sometimes not. Humans are imperfect utilitarians because we do a crappy job of counting the potential benefit and costs of all beings involved, with appropriate weights.
I don’t see humans as repugnant monsters because I don’t give humans infinitely more weight in this scaling.
Nice post.
I disagree with the premise that humans are utility monsters, but I see what you are getting at.
I’m a little weary of the concept of a utility monster as it is easy to imagine and debate but I don’t think it is immediately realistic.
I want my considerations of utility to be aware of possible future outcomes. If we imagine a concrete scenario like Zach’s fantastic slave pyramid builders for an increasingly happy man, it seems obvious that there is something psychotic about an individual who could be made more happy by the senseless toil of other conscious beings. That is not the desired outcome of implementing their naive ‘utilitarian ethics computer’ genie.
I agree that that situation is repugnant. I think this is created from a poor implementation of their ‘utilitarian ethics computer’.
Here’s why humans in general are not repugnant: We are not using the suffering of others to increase solely our own happiness. At least not directly, deliberately and relentlessly.
I do agree that sometimes the life-satisfaction of squirrels is cut short by humans building dams (to follow your example).
Sometimes this could be morally right, sometimes not. Humans are imperfect utilitarians because we do a crappy job of counting the potential benefit and costs of all beings involved, with appropriate weights.
I don’t see humans as repugnant monsters because I don’t give humans infinitely more weight in this scaling.