When it becomes clear that you’re talking to somebody who doesn’t like the group you’re in, it is actually unsettling, on the primate level.
The really tricky part here, however, is how one detects this dislike. If you suggest to an Elbonian nationalist that Ruritanians may perhaps have a better case in some obscure matter of dispute with Elbonia, this may well cause his group-dislike trigger to go off, and he’ll react as if you just described him and his entire people as the lowest scum of the Earth. Now, if you actually said the latter, I wouldn’t be holding his anger against him—what’s problematic is his extrapolation from a particular claim, which reasonable people should be able to discuss calmly, to an all-out dislike and hostility targeted at his group. Such unreasonable extrapolation is one of the principal sources of political and ideological passions in general.
(Analogously, notice how in gender-related discussions in our society, many sorts of claims are automatically met with accusations of “misogyny,” which is often a straightforward instance of this pattern—a particular claim or argument is treated as implying all-out irrational hatred against the whole group whose interests it supposedly impinges on. LW is, thank God, typically far above this level, but I do think that the same pattern is occasionally manifesting itself, if in more subtle ways.)
Let’s drop the hypotheticals and get down to brass tacks here.
I don’t think LW is all that mean to women compared to other communities. It’s just in the strange position of having some overlap between women who use women’s-studies vocabulary, and men who come from a technical, majority-male world. So there are people holding the site to a very high standard of sensitivity on gender issues (these are mostly women) and there are people holding the site to a very high standard of impartiality and disinterested rationality.
Those standards are in tension. On the one hand, sensitivity requires us to acknowledge that humans are social animals, that they have group loyalties, that they tend to believe in “halo effects” and “horn effects” about groups of people, and that in order to make people comfortable on this site we have to make it clear to them that we don’t bear them ill will based on their gender. We can’t reasonably expect people to take all statements one at a time and disregard their typical correlation with attitudes and biases. (For example, would you be convinced by someone who said “I’m not an anti-Semite! I have no problem with Jews; it’s simply a fact that they’re not as honest in business as the rest of us”?)
In other words, the standard of sensitivity calls on us to work with typical human biases, to treat humans as political/social animals as a matter of practical reality, and to consider it justifiable when people think within this framework (for example, by perceiving misogyny.)
The standard of impartiality (or “reasonableness”) calls on us to reduce biases and group loyalties, to not behave as political animals, to as nearly as possible go by universal principles and reasoning that can be universally shared. Sensitivity treats discussion as a negotiation (“Be nice, or I won’t feel comfortable and I’ll leave,”) while impartiality treats discussion as an attempt to find truth (“You have no good reason to be upset—I haven’t wronged you.”)
Sensitivity and impartiality are at odds. I tend to think that too much sensitivity keeps us from actually learning or getting anything done; but I also think that too much impartiality is unrealistic and will drive people away.
However, I’d like to build on your Elbonian example. Suppose that our defender-of-Ruritania-in-just-this-obscure-dispute happens to mention the Ruritania dispute during a discussion of Elbonian music. The subject is brought up again when Elbonian dairy products are mentioned. When the soccer match between Elbonia and Femurgia is being dissected, our friend again brings up that obscure dispute with Ruritania.
After a few weeks of this, would the Elbonian be completely irrational to reach the conclusion that this guy apparently doesn’t care much for Elbonia?
All sorts of patterns are visible to those who look for them.
After a few weeks of this, would the Elbonian be completely irrational to reach the conclusion that this guy apparently doesn’t care much for Elbonia?
No—but it is absolutely crucial in this case that the same person is involved in each interaction. If instead they involved three different people, it would be entirely unfair to transfer the (very slight) evidence of anti-Elbonia hostility on the part of the first two people to the third guy, so that he seems three times as hostile as the first person did.
(It’s also crucial that the topic of discussion was assumed to be unrelated specifically to the dispute.)
… it is absolutely crucial in this case that the same person is involved in each interaction.
As an abstract issue of fairness and rationality, you are of course correct. However, our Elbonian friend might be forgiven for seeing things differently if he is reminded of an old Elbonian proverb—something about failing to notice the wolf pack due to being distracted by the wolves.
SarahC:
The really tricky part here, however, is how one detects this dislike. If you suggest to an Elbonian nationalist that Ruritanians may perhaps have a better case in some obscure matter of dispute with Elbonia, this may well cause his group-dislike trigger to go off, and he’ll react as if you just described him and his entire people as the lowest scum of the Earth. Now, if you actually said the latter, I wouldn’t be holding his anger against him—what’s problematic is his extrapolation from a particular claim, which reasonable people should be able to discuss calmly, to an all-out dislike and hostility targeted at his group. Such unreasonable extrapolation is one of the principal sources of political and ideological passions in general.
(Analogously, notice how in gender-related discussions in our society, many sorts of claims are automatically met with accusations of “misogyny,” which is often a straightforward instance of this pattern—a particular claim or argument is treated as implying all-out irrational hatred against the whole group whose interests it supposedly impinges on. LW is, thank God, typically far above this level, but I do think that the same pattern is occasionally manifesting itself, if in more subtle ways.)
Let’s drop the hypotheticals and get down to brass tacks here.
I don’t think LW is all that mean to women compared to other communities. It’s just in the strange position of having some overlap between women who use women’s-studies vocabulary, and men who come from a technical, majority-male world. So there are people holding the site to a very high standard of sensitivity on gender issues (these are mostly women) and there are people holding the site to a very high standard of impartiality and disinterested rationality.
Those standards are in tension. On the one hand, sensitivity requires us to acknowledge that humans are social animals, that they have group loyalties, that they tend to believe in “halo effects” and “horn effects” about groups of people, and that in order to make people comfortable on this site we have to make it clear to them that we don’t bear them ill will based on their gender. We can’t reasonably expect people to take all statements one at a time and disregard their typical correlation with attitudes and biases. (For example, would you be convinced by someone who said “I’m not an anti-Semite! I have no problem with Jews; it’s simply a fact that they’re not as honest in business as the rest of us”?)
In other words, the standard of sensitivity calls on us to work with typical human biases, to treat humans as political/social animals as a matter of practical reality, and to consider it justifiable when people think within this framework (for example, by perceiving misogyny.)
The standard of impartiality (or “reasonableness”) calls on us to reduce biases and group loyalties, to not behave as political animals, to as nearly as possible go by universal principles and reasoning that can be universally shared. Sensitivity treats discussion as a negotiation (“Be nice, or I won’t feel comfortable and I’ll leave,”) while impartiality treats discussion as an attempt to find truth (“You have no good reason to be upset—I haven’t wronged you.”)
Sensitivity and impartiality are at odds. I tend to think that too much sensitivity keeps us from actually learning or getting anything done; but I also think that too much impartiality is unrealistic and will drive people away.
Upvoted. Good point.
However, I’d like to build on your Elbonian example. Suppose that our defender-of-Ruritania-in-just-this-obscure-dispute happens to mention the Ruritania dispute during a discussion of Elbonian music. The subject is brought up again when Elbonian dairy products are mentioned. When the soccer match between Elbonia and Femurgia is being dissected, our friend again brings up that obscure dispute with Ruritania.
After a few weeks of this, would the Elbonian be completely irrational to reach the conclusion that this guy apparently doesn’t care much for Elbonia?
All sorts of patterns are visible to those who look for them.
No—but it is absolutely crucial in this case that the same person is involved in each interaction. If instead they involved three different people, it would be entirely unfair to transfer the (very slight) evidence of anti-Elbonia hostility on the part of the first two people to the third guy, so that he seems three times as hostile as the first person did.
(It’s also crucial that the topic of discussion was assumed to be unrelated specifically to the dispute.)
As an abstract issue of fairness and rationality, you are of course correct. However, our Elbonian friend might be forgiven for seeing things differently if he is reminded of an old Elbonian proverb—something about failing to notice the wolf pack due to being distracted by the wolves.