Rather than having all (biological) men think of themselves as “men” and likewise for women, wouldn’t it be better if each individual tried to estimate where their brainware falls between male and female averages? Even if there is a difference between male and female average brainwares (and no matter how large it is), the standard deviations might also be large.
If all we know about a person is their sex, then we may see fit to make inferences about their brainware from average sex differences. But we presumably know more about ourselves than our sex, even if we do not fully understand ourselves. One has a large amount of data about oneself, since one has been present for all of one’s experiences (though, of course, there are biases unique to self-judgment, as well). From considering all this evidence, one might be able to infer one’s position in brainware-space much better than one would be able to on the basis of one’s sex alone. This would let one place oneself more precisely along the line that passes through “male average” and “female average” in brainware-space, and so it would allow one to make predictions on the basis of other people’s sex. In this case, thinking of oneself as simply a “man” or a “woman” would not be the best strategy.
Rather than having all (biological) men think of themselves as “men” and likewise for women, wouldn’t it be better if each individual tried to estimate where their brainware falls between male and female averages? Even if there is a difference between male and female average brainwares (and no matter how large it is), the standard deviations might also be large.
If all we know about a person is their sex, then we may see fit to make inferences about their brainware from average sex differences. But we presumably know more about ourselves than our sex, even if we do not fully understand ourselves. One has a large amount of data about oneself, since one has been present for all of one’s experiences (though, of course, there are biases unique to self-judgment, as well). From considering all this evidence, one might be able to infer one’s position in brainware-space much better than one would be able to on the basis of one’s sex alone. This would let one place oneself more precisely along the line that passes through “male average” and “female average” in brainware-space, and so it would allow one to make predictions on the basis of other people’s sex. In this case, thinking of oneself as simply a “man” or a “woman” would not be the best strategy.