It is easier to determine whether you are doing “better” than your current self than it is to determine how well you line up with a perceived ideal being. So perhaps the lesson to take away is to try to just be better rather than be perfect.
It is easier to determine whether you are doing “better” than your current self than it is to determine how well you line up with a perceived ideal being.
Really? That doesn’t seem obvious to me. Could you justify that claim?
An “ideal” being is many layers of “better” than you are, whereas something that is simply better is only one layer better. To get to ideal, you would have to imagine someone better, then imagine what that person would consider better, and so forth, until you hit a state where there are no further improvements to be made.
In the picture you just drew, the ideal being is derived from a series of better beings, thus it is (trivially) easier to imagine a better being than to imagine an ideal being.
I see it differently: The ideal being maximizes all good qualities, whereas imperfect beings have differing levels of the various good qualities. Thus to compare a non-ideal being to an ideal being, we only need to recognize how the ideal being does better than the non-ideal being in each good quality. But to compare two non-ideal beings, we need to evaluate trade-offs between their various attributes (unless one is strictly greater than the other)
Thinking about it more, I am not happy with either of the above models. One question that arises is: Does the same reasoning extend to other cases as well? i.e. are we better off thinking about incremental improvements than about the ideal society? Are we better off thinking about incremental improvements than about the ideal chess algorithm?
I think in some cases maybe we are, but in some cases we aren’t—ideals are useful sometimes. I’d go farther to say that some aspects of many ideals must be arrived at by iterating, but other aspects can be concluded more directly. An uninteresting conclusion, but one that supports my overall point: I wasn’t claiming that I knew everything about the ideal FAI, just that I had justified high confidence in some things.
This is a really good point.
It is easier to determine whether you are doing “better” than your current self than it is to determine how well you line up with a perceived ideal being. So perhaps the lesson to take away is to try to just be better rather than be perfect.
Really? That doesn’t seem obvious to me. Could you justify that claim?
An “ideal” being is many layers of “better” than you are, whereas something that is simply better is only one layer better. To get to ideal, you would have to imagine someone better, then imagine what that person would consider better, and so forth, until you hit a state where there are no further improvements to be made.
In the picture you just drew, the ideal being is derived from a series of better beings, thus it is (trivially) easier to imagine a better being than to imagine an ideal being.
I see it differently: The ideal being maximizes all good qualities, whereas imperfect beings have differing levels of the various good qualities. Thus to compare a non-ideal being to an ideal being, we only need to recognize how the ideal being does better than the non-ideal being in each good quality. But to compare two non-ideal beings, we need to evaluate trade-offs between their various attributes (unless one is strictly greater than the other)
Thinking about it more, I am not happy with either of the above models. One question that arises is: Does the same reasoning extend to other cases as well? i.e. are we better off thinking about incremental improvements than about the ideal society? Are we better off thinking about incremental improvements than about the ideal chess algorithm?
I think in some cases maybe we are, but in some cases we aren’t—ideals are useful sometimes. I’d go farther to say that some aspects of many ideals must be arrived at by iterating, but other aspects can be concluded more directly. An uninteresting conclusion, but one that supports my overall point: I wasn’t claiming that I knew everything about the ideal FAI, just that I had justified high confidence in some things.