Procreation* gives both FDT and CDT agents (and indeed, all agents) the same dilemma. FDT agents procreate and live miserably; CDT agents don’t procreate and almost certainly don’t exist. FDT beats CDT in this dilemma.
This doesn’t seem right: you already exist! In order to say that “FDT beats CDT” I think you have to argue that one should care about the number of branches you exist in—which is what you plausibly have uncertainty about, not about whether this very instance of you exists. (And this is arguably just about preferences, as Christiano writes about here. So it is unclear what it would even mean to say that “FDT beats CDT”.) That is, this is about implementing a specific version of mixed-upside updatelessness or not—specifically, the multiverse version of MUU I describe here.
Sure, I already exist; together with the fact that I make the exact same decision my father made, that implies I procreate and therefore I’m not a CDT’er.
The point with these problems is, I believe, that your decision procedure is implemented at least 1 time, but possibly 2 times throughout time—depending on what your decision procedure outputs.
In Procreation*, if “my” decision procedure outputs “procreate”, it first does so “in” my father, who then procreates, causing me to exist. I then also procreate.
But if “my” decision procedure outputs “don’t procreate”, it also first does so “in” my father, who then doesn’t procreate, and then I don’t exist.
The question “Should I procreate?” is a bit misleading, then, as I possibly don’t exist.
Or, we indeed assume I do exist; but then it’s not much of a decision problem anymore. If I exist, then my father procreated, and I necessarily procreate too.
This doesn’t seem right: you already exist! In order to say that “FDT beats CDT” I think you have to argue that one should care about the number of branches you exist in—which is what you plausibly have uncertainty about, not about whether this very instance of you exists. (And this is arguably just about preferences, as Christiano writes about here. So it is unclear what it would even mean to say that “FDT beats CDT”.) That is, this is about implementing a specific version of mixed-upside updatelessness or not—specifically, the multiverse version of MUU I describe here.
Thanks for your reaction!
Sure, I already exist; together with the fact that I make the exact same decision my father made, that implies I procreate and therefore I’m not a CDT’er.
The point with these problems is, I believe, that your decision procedure is implemented at least 1 time, but possibly 2 times throughout time—depending on what your decision procedure outputs.
In Procreation*, if “my” decision procedure outputs “procreate”, it first does so “in” my father, who then procreates, causing me to exist. I then also procreate.
But if “my” decision procedure outputs “don’t procreate”, it also first does so “in” my father, who then doesn’t procreate, and then I don’t exist.
The question “Should I procreate?” is a bit misleading, then, as I possibly don’t exist.
Or, we indeed assume I do exist; but then it’s not much of a decision problem anymore. If I exist, then my father procreated, and I necessarily procreate too.