Looks like from a rational perspective we can notice that our sensors are fallible.
Breathing walls seems to be the whole body/heart beat throwing the visual field out of lock. Usually counteracted by the brain in normal processing of the vision.
Visual snow is the noise in the visual field if it’s too sensitive and after image is literally after image in the proteins in the back of the eye.
The gap between the sensor bug, brain compensation mechanism and imaginary mental “control” of a kasina after image is a pretty slim one.
It is interesting to explore that and hopefully can help break people out of perfect trust in what they have of their sensory apparatuses and brain interpretation mechanisms
Some people have it more than others.
From a non rational and mystical perspective, as the distinction between map and territory becomes blurred and the white noise can organise itself into information, there are interesting things to be learned about the way that s1 “knows” things that system 2 does not explicitly know until it self inquires.
Could you give examples of s1 “knowing” things until s2 inquires? I can understand how it “knows” visual snow, and by doing these tests we are “inquiring” about it. But I’m sure there are other contexts (other than visual information) where this concept is true.
S1 knows a lot of things. Some examples include “gut feel”, that can usually be inquired about and led back to a memory.
Example: I was once playing Blood on the Clocktower, a group party game. I used my gut to suspect someone, when I asked it why, A moment of the person looking down in a particular way after saying something came to mind. Turns out I was right and we killed the evil person on the first turn. Something that’s supposed to take all game.
S1 knows how to ski better than S2. When I went skiing a few years ago, people would ski for a bit while watching what their s1 was doing, then stop to explain which way to lean or how to ski and repeat for a few instructions (lean to the left, put the weight to the right). Skiing has some counter-lean behaviours which are hard to insist via s2 first.
The same thing applies for juggling, or learning how to juggle, riding a bike, swimming, dancing, and most physical skills.
S1 also handles emotions better, where s2 would like to cognitively soothe via intellectual justification, s1 can usually declare, “I feel bad”, and soothe via self validation of emotion in a way that s2 can only narrative about how I feel bad and why.
Looks like from a rational perspective we can notice that our sensors are fallible.
Breathing walls seems to be the whole body/heart beat throwing the visual field out of lock. Usually counteracted by the brain in normal processing of the vision.
Visual snow is the noise in the visual field if it’s too sensitive and after image is literally after image in the proteins in the back of the eye.
The gap between the sensor bug, brain compensation mechanism and imaginary mental “control” of a kasina after image is a pretty slim one.
It is interesting to explore that and hopefully can help break people out of perfect trust in what they have of their sensory apparatuses and brain interpretation mechanisms
Some people have it more than others.
From a non rational and mystical perspective, as the distinction between map and territory becomes blurred and the white noise can organise itself into information, there are interesting things to be learned about the way that s1 “knows” things that system 2 does not explicitly know until it self inquires.
Could you give examples of s1 “knowing” things until s2 inquires? I can understand how it “knows” visual snow, and by doing these tests we are “inquiring” about it. But I’m sure there are other contexts (other than visual information) where this concept is true.
S1 knows a lot of things. Some examples include “gut feel”, that can usually be inquired about and led back to a memory.
Example: I was once playing Blood on the Clocktower, a group party game. I used my gut to suspect someone, when I asked it why, A moment of the person looking down in a particular way after saying something came to mind. Turns out I was right and we killed the evil person on the first turn. Something that’s supposed to take all game.
S1 knows how to ski better than S2. When I went skiing a few years ago, people would ski for a bit while watching what their s1 was doing, then stop to explain which way to lean or how to ski and repeat for a few instructions (lean to the left, put the weight to the right). Skiing has some counter-lean behaviours which are hard to insist via s2 first.
The same thing applies for juggling, or learning how to juggle, riding a bike, swimming, dancing, and most physical skills.
S1 also handles emotions better, where s2 would like to cognitively soothe via intellectual justification, s1 can usually declare, “I feel bad”, and soothe via self validation of emotion in a way that s2 can only narrative about how I feel bad and why.