Remember, that-which-exists at any moment does not just consist of a set of worlds, but a set of worlds each with a complex number attached. And that-which-exists in the next moment is—the same set of worlds, but now with different complex numbers attached.
You seem to be talking about the wavefunction, which is a complex function defined over the configuration space (a set of configurations each with a complex number attached). But in that case you seem to be confusing a world with a configuration. A configuration defines only position. (Assuming we’re talking about positional configuration space.)
It seems I can save myself some trouble explaining by quoting Eliezer:
A point mass of amplitude, concentrated into a single exact position in configuration space, does not correspond to a precisely known state of the universe. It is physical nonsense.
It’s like asking, in Conway’s Game of Life: “What is the future state of this one cell, regardless of the cells around it?” The immediate future of the cell depends on its immediate neighbors; its distant future may depend on distant neighbors.
If Conway’s Game of Life managed to support a multiverse, then a single universe in this multiverse would not correspond to a cell. It would correspond to some section of the whole pattern quite a bit larger than a single cell—a section which was for the most part causally separated from the rest of the pattern. And this section might move around over Conway’s gameboard (or whatever it’s called), just as a glider can move across Conway’s gameboard.
Remember, that-which-exists at any moment does not just consist of a set of worlds, but a set of worlds each with a complex number attached. And that-which-exists in the next moment is—the same set of worlds, but now with different complex numbers attached.
You seem to be talking about the wavefunction, which is a complex function defined over the configuration space (a set of configurations each with a complex number attached). But in that case you seem to be confusing a world with a configuration. A configuration defines only position. (Assuming we’re talking about positional configuration space.)
It seems I can save myself some trouble explaining by quoting Eliezer:
If Conway’s Game of Life managed to support a multiverse, then a single universe in this multiverse would not correspond to a cell. It would correspond to some section of the whole pattern quite a bit larger than a single cell—a section which was for the most part causally separated from the rest of the pattern. And this section might move around over Conway’s gameboard (or whatever it’s called), just as a glider can move across Conway’s gameboard.