“These are people whose utility function does not place a higher utility on ‘dieing but not having to take my meds’.”
Why are you making claims about their utility functions that the data does not back? Either people prefer less to more, knowingly, or they are making rational decisions about ignorance, and not violating their “ugh” field, which is costly for them.
How is that any different than a smoker being uncomfortable quitting smoking? (Here I recognize that smoking is obviously a rational behavior for people who choose to smoke).
I get it. You define humans as rational agents with utility functions of whatever it is that they happen to do because it was convenient for the purposes of a model they taught you in Economics 101. You are still just wrong.
Your posts under this name have the potential for some hilarious and educational trolling, though you have some stiff competition if you want to be the best.
You should probably refine your approach a little bit. Links to the literature would give you more points for style. Also, the parenthetical aside was a bit much—it made the trolling too obvious.
How is that any different than a smoker being uncomfortable quitting smoking?
It’s pretty similar, actually: just as a smoker may prefer to quit but find doing so psychologically difficult, someone with a terminal illness may prefer to take their meds but also find it difficult. It’s not clear how to assign utility in such a case, as the agent involved isn’t a unified whole. There’s the sub-agent who is addicted and the sub-agent who wants to quit.
“These are people whose utility function does not place a higher utility on ‘dieing but not having to take my meds’.”
Why are you making claims about their utility functions that the data does not back? Either people prefer less to more, knowingly, or they are making rational decisions about ignorance, and not violating their “ugh” field, which is costly for them.
How is that any different than a smoker being uncomfortable quitting smoking? (Here I recognize that smoking is obviously a rational behavior for people who choose to smoke).
I get it. You define humans as rational agents with utility functions of whatever it is that they happen to do because it was convenient for the purposes of a model they taught you in Economics 101. You are still just wrong.
Your posts under this name have the potential for some hilarious and educational trolling, though you have some stiff competition if you want to be the best.
You should probably refine your approach a little bit. Links to the literature would give you more points for style. Also, the parenthetical aside was a bit much—it made the trolling too obvious.
It’s pretty similar, actually: just as a smoker may prefer to quit but find doing so psychologically difficult, someone with a terminal illness may prefer to take their meds but also find it difficult. It’s not clear how to assign utility in such a case, as the agent involved isn’t a unified whole. There’s the sub-agent who is addicted and the sub-agent who wants to quit.