As we have seen in the former post, the latter question is confusing (and maybe confused) because the value change itself implies a change of the evaluative framework.
I’m not sure which part of the previous post you’re referring to actually – if you could point me to the relevant section that would be great!
yes, sorry! I’m not making it super explicit, actually, but the point is that, if you read e.g. Paul or Callard’s accounts of value change (via transformative experiences and via aspiration respectively), a large part of how they even set up their inquiries is with respect to the question whether value change is irrational or not (or what problem value change poses to rational agency). The rationality problem comes up bc it’s unclear from what vantage point one should evaluate the rationality (i.e. the “keeping with what expected utiltiy theory tells you to do”) of the (decision to undergo) value change. From the vantage point of your past self, it’s irrational; from the vantage point of your new self (be it as parent, vampire or jazz lover), it may be rational.
Form what I can tell, Paul’s framing of transformative experiences is closer to “yes, transformative experiences are irrational (or a-rational) but they still happen; I guess we have to just accept that as a ‘glitch’ in humans as rational agents”; while Callard’s core contribution (in my eyes) is her case for why aspiration is a rational process of value development.
I’m not sure which part of the previous post you’re referring to actually – if you could point me to the relevant section that would be great!
yes, sorry! I’m not making it super explicit, actually, but the point is that, if you read e.g. Paul or Callard’s accounts of value change (via transformative experiences and via aspiration respectively), a large part of how they even set up their inquiries is with respect to the question whether value change is irrational or not (or what problem value change poses to rational agency). The rationality problem comes up bc it’s unclear from what vantage point one should evaluate the rationality (i.e. the “keeping with what expected utiltiy theory tells you to do”) of the (decision to undergo) value change. From the vantage point of your past self, it’s irrational; from the vantage point of your new self (be it as parent, vampire or jazz lover), it may be rational.
Form what I can tell, Paul’s framing of transformative experiences is closer to “yes, transformative experiences are irrational (or a-rational) but they still happen; I guess we have to just accept that as a ‘glitch’ in humans as rational agents”; while Callard’s core contribution (in my eyes) is her case for why aspiration is a rational process of value development.