So all hardware limitations on us boil down to speed and memory capacity. And both of those can be augmented to the level of any other entity that is in the universe. Because if somebody builds a computer that can think faster than the brain, then we can use that very computer or that very technology to make our thinking go just as fast as that. So that’s the hardware.
[…]
So if we take the hardware, we know that our brains are Turing-complete bits of hardware, and therefore can exhibit the functionality of running any computable program and function.
So the more memory and time you give it, the more closely it could simulate the whole universe. But it couldn’t ever simulate the whole universe or anything near the whole universe because it is hard for it to simulate itself. Also, the sheer size of the universe is large.
I think this happens when people encounter the Deutsch’s claim that humans are universal explainers, and then misgeneralize the claim to Turing machines.
So the more interesting question is: Is there a computational class somewhere between FSAs and PDAs that is able to, given enough “resources”, execute arbitrary programs? What physical systems do these correspond to?
That seems an odd motte-and-bailey style explanation (and likely, belief. As you say, misgeneralized).
I will agree that humans can execute TINY arbitrary Turing calculations, and slightly less tiny (but still very small) with some external storage. And quite a bit larger with external storage and computation. At what point is the brain not doing the computation is perhaps an important crux in that claim, as is whether the ability to emulate a Turing machine in the conscious/intentional layer is the same as being Turing-complete in the meatware substrate.
And the bailey of “if we can expand storage and speed up computation, then it would be truly general” is kind of tautological, and kind of unjustified without figuring out HOW to expand storage and computation while remaining human.
On a twitter lent at the moment, but I remember this thread. There’s also a short section in an interview with David Deutsch:
and:
I think this happens when people encounter the Deutsch’s claim that humans are universal explainers, and then misgeneralize the claim to Turing machines.
So the more interesting question is: Is there a computational class somewhere between FSAs and PDAs that is able to, given enough “resources”, execute arbitrary programs? What physical systems do these correspond to?
Related: Are there cognitive realms? (Tsvi Benson-Tilsen, 2022)
That seems an odd motte-and-bailey style explanation (and likely, belief. As you say, misgeneralized).
I will agree that humans can execute TINY arbitrary Turing calculations, and slightly less tiny (but still very small) with some external storage. And quite a bit larger with external storage and computation. At what point is the brain not doing the computation is perhaps an important crux in that claim, as is whether the ability to emulate a Turing machine in the conscious/intentional layer is the same as being Turing-complete in the meatware substrate.
And the bailey of “if we can expand storage and speed up computation, then it would be truly general” is kind of tautological, and kind of unjustified without figuring out HOW to expand storage and computation while remaining human.
From my side or theirs?
From their side. Your explanation and arguments against that seem reasonable to me.