If the universe is completely non-deterministic with infinite random events happening, shouldn’t the odds of my living in the specific sub-universe that appears fully deterministic be almost indistinguishable from zero?
As I said, I want to argue that the sizes of ordered and chaotic regions are of the same cardinality.
I’m not quite sure what it means that you “want to argue … the same cardinality.” Argue it or don’t. As near as I can tell, you didn’t, or at least you didn’t argue how this prevents our universe from being overwhelmingly strong evidence against this theory.
Still, identical cardinality wouldn’t get you out of this one. >0, , < infinity. This does not mean that if I pick a number at random out of the latter, I am just as likely to pick in the 0-1 range as I am to pick outside of it. Please correct me if this analogy is somehow inappropriate.
If I understand the gyst of the theory, saying that our universe is acausal is saying that any random causally unexplainable event could occur at any time. If this theory is true, I should expect with extraordinarily high probability to see at least one acausal event (and, for that matter, I should expect with high probability for the universe to spontaneously convert to “static,” which would unmake me). Since an acausal event wouldn’t necessarily destroy me, this theory can’t even cheat by using the anthropic principle.
Events that are predicted with overwhelming probability never happening is about the most damning evidence against a theory that exists. Events that are predicted with unbelievably low probability happening not only often but invariably is also about the most damning evidence against a theory that exists.
The theory is admittedly undisprovable, so you can take some comfort in never being proven wrong, but you really, really shouldn’t. Non-disprovability is generally a very undesirable attribute, at least if you care about finding the truth.
Ok, it seems that if you’re right to choose density over cardinality then it’s a blow to my proposal.
I’m still trying to figure it out. Suppose the universe is an infinite Hume world. So is it true that even though there are just as many ordered regions, the likelihood that I live in one is almost zero?
As I said, I want to argue that the sizes of ordered and chaotic regions are of the same cardinality.
I’m not quite sure what it means that you “want to argue … the same cardinality.” Argue it or don’t. As near as I can tell, you didn’t, or at least you didn’t argue how this prevents our universe from being overwhelmingly strong evidence against this theory.
Still, identical cardinality wouldn’t get you out of this one. >0, , < infinity. This does not mean that if I pick a number at random out of the latter, I am just as likely to pick in the 0-1 range as I am to pick outside of it. Please correct me if this analogy is somehow inappropriate.
If I understand the gyst of the theory, saying that our universe is acausal is saying that any random causally unexplainable event could occur at any time. If this theory is true, I should expect with extraordinarily high probability to see at least one acausal event (and, for that matter, I should expect with high probability for the universe to spontaneously convert to “static,” which would unmake me). Since an acausal event wouldn’t necessarily destroy me, this theory can’t even cheat by using the anthropic principle.
Events that are predicted with overwhelming probability never happening is about the most damning evidence against a theory that exists. Events that are predicted with unbelievably low probability happening not only often but invariably is also about the most damning evidence against a theory that exists.
The theory is admittedly undisprovable, so you can take some comfort in never being proven wrong, but you really, really shouldn’t. Non-disprovability is generally a very undesirable attribute, at least if you care about finding the truth.
Ok, it seems that if you’re right to choose density over cardinality then it’s a blow to my proposal. I’m still trying to figure it out. Suppose the universe is an infinite Hume world. So is it true that even though there are just as many ordered regions, the likelihood that I live in one is almost zero?
That’s irrelevant. The density of ordered points within the region of possibilities is what is relevant, and that density is almost zero.