I’d be willing to give this a shot, but his thesis, as stated, seems very slippery (I haven’t read the book):
“Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe.”
This needs to be reworded but appears to be straightforwardly true and uncontroversial: morality is connected to well-being and suffering.
“Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end).”
True and uncontroversial on a loose enough interpretation of “constrained”.
“Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science.”
This is the central claim in the thesis—and the most (only?) controversial one—but he’s already qualifying it with “potentially.” I’m guessing any response of his will turn on (a) the fact that he’s only saying it might be the case and (b) arbitrarily broadening the definition of science. Nevertheless, moral questions aren’t (even potentially) empirical, since they’re obviously seeking normative and not factual answers. But given that this is obvious, it’s hard to imagine that one could change his mind. It’s rather like being invited to challenge the thesis of someone who claims scientific theories are works of fiction. You’ve got your work cut out when somebody has found themselves that far off the beaten path. I suspect the argument of the book runs: this philosophical thesis is misguided, this philosophical thesis is misguided, etc, science is good, we can get something that sort of looks like morality from science, so science—i.e., he takes himself to be explaining morality when he’s actually offering a replacement. That’s very hard to argue against. I think, at best, you’re looking at $2000 for saying something he finds interesting and new, but that’s very subjective.
“On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.”
Assuming “what they deem important in life” is supposed to be parsed as “morality” then this appears to follow from his thesis.
“Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe.”
So if we couldn’t suffer, we wouldn’t have any values? I don’t think so.
Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science. On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.
Nevertheless, moral questions aren’t (even potentially) empirical, since they’re obviously seeking normative and not factual answers.
You can’t go from an is to an ought. Nevertheless, some people go from the “well-being and suffering” idea to ideas like consequentialism and utilitarianism, and from there the only remaining questions are factual. Other people are prepared to see a factual basis for morality in neuroscience and game theory. These are regular topics of discussion on LW. So calling it “obvious” begs the whole question.
I’d be willing to give this a shot, but his thesis, as stated, seems very slippery (I haven’t read the book):
“Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe.”
This needs to be reworded but appears to be straightforwardly true and uncontroversial: morality is connected to well-being and suffering.
“Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end).”
True and uncontroversial on a loose enough interpretation of “constrained”.
“Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science.”
This is the central claim in the thesis—and the most (only?) controversial one—but he’s already qualifying it with “potentially.” I’m guessing any response of his will turn on (a) the fact that he’s only saying it might be the case and (b) arbitrarily broadening the definition of science. Nevertheless, moral questions aren’t (even potentially) empirical, since they’re obviously seeking normative and not factual answers. But given that this is obvious, it’s hard to imagine that one could change his mind. It’s rather like being invited to challenge the thesis of someone who claims scientific theories are works of fiction. You’ve got your work cut out when somebody has found themselves that far off the beaten path. I suspect the argument of the book runs: this philosophical thesis is misguided, this philosophical thesis is misguided, etc, science is good, we can get something that sort of looks like morality from science, so science—i.e., he takes himself to be explaining morality when he’s actually offering a replacement. That’s very hard to argue against. I think, at best, you’re looking at $2000 for saying something he finds interesting and new, but that’s very subjective.
“On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.”
Assuming “what they deem important in life” is supposed to be parsed as “morality” then this appears to follow from his thesis.
So if we couldn’t suffer, we wouldn’t have any values? I don’t think so.
He skips the qualifier in his FAQ:
You can’t go from an is to an ought. Nevertheless, some people go from the “well-being and suffering” idea to ideas like consequentialism and utilitarianism, and from there the only remaining questions are factual. Other people are prepared to see a factual basis for morality in neuroscience and game theory. These are regular topics of discussion on LW. So calling it “obvious” begs the whole question.