If you claim that evolutionary reasons are a person’s ‘true preferences’
No, of course not. It’s still wrong to say that deterrent is nowhere in their brains.
Concerning the others:
Scientific inquiry percieves facts which are true and useful except for goals which run directly counter to science. Morality perceives ‘facts’ which are only useful to those who wish to follow a moral route.
I don’t see what “goals which run directly counter to science” could mean. Even if you want to destroy all scientists, are you better off knowing some science or not? Anyway, how does this counter anything Harris says?
Although most people would be outraged, they probably wouldn’t call it unscientific.
Again, so what? How does anything here prevent science from talking about morality?
As far as I can tell, Harris does not account for the well-being of animals.
He talks about well-being of conscious beings. It’s not great terminology, but your inference is your own.
A- O.K, demonstrate that the idea of deterrent exists somewhere within their brains.
B- Although it would be as alien as being a paperclip maximiser, say I deliberately want to know as little as possible. That would be a hypothetical goal for which science would not be useful.
As for how this counters Harris- Harris claims that some things are moral by definition and claims that proper morality is a subcategory of science. I counterargue that the fundamental differences between the nature of morality and the nature of science are problems with this categorisation.
I’m not sure if Harris’s health analogy is relevant enough to this part of the argument to put here, but it falls flat because health is relevant to far more potential human goals than morality is. Moral dilemnas in which a person has to choose between two possible moral values are plausibly enough adressed (though I have reservations) I’ll give him a pass on that one- but what about a situation where a person has to choose between acting selfishly and acting selflessly? You can say one is the moral choice by defintion depending on the definition of moral, but saying “It’s moral so do it” leads to the question “Why should I do what is moral”? With health people don’t actually question it because it tends to support their goals, although there is a similarity Harris and his critics do not appear to realise in that a person can and might ask “Why should I do what is healthy?” in some circumstances.
C- What I am trying to say argue with my psycopath analogy is that something can be good science without in any way being moral that Sam Harris would recognise as ‘moral’. The psycopath is in my scenario using the scientific method in every way except those which he can’t by definition given his goals- he even has a peer review commitee! His behaviour is therefore just as scientific as the scientist trying to, say, cure cancer.
D- I was only acting from what I read in his responses to the critics, which was my disclaimer from the start. I made a mistake, but I left open the possibility of such for lack of time.
O.K, demonstrate that the idea of deterrent exists somewhere within their brains.
Evolutionary game theory and punishment of defectors is all the answer you need. You want me to point at a deterrent region, somewhere to the left of Broca’s?
You say that science is useful for truths about the universe, whereas morality is useful for truths useful only to those interested in acting morally. It sounds like you agree with Harris that morality is a subcategory of science.
something can be good science without in any way being moral that Sam Harris would recognise as ‘moral’.
Still, so what? He’s not saying that all science is moral (in the sense of “benevolent” and “good for the world”). That would be ridiculous, and would be orthogonal to the argument of whether science can address questions of morality.
A- Not so. If the human does not consciously nor subconsciously care about deterrent, evolutionary reasons are irrelevant.
B- Only if, and this is a big if, you agree with the Elizier-Harris school of thought which say some things are morally true by definition. Because Harris agrees with him, I was granting him that as his own unique idea of what being moral is. However, at that point I was concerned with demonstrating morality cannot fit as a subcategory of science.
C- Harris appears to claim that there is a scientific basis for valuing wellbeing- he repudiates the hypothesis that there is none explicitly by claiming it comparable to the claim there is no scientific basis for valuing health.
No, of course not. It’s still wrong to say that deterrent is nowhere in their brains.
Concerning the others:
I don’t see what “goals which run directly counter to science” could mean. Even if you want to destroy all scientists, are you better off knowing some science or not? Anyway, how does this counter anything Harris says?
Again, so what? How does anything here prevent science from talking about morality?
He talks about well-being of conscious beings. It’s not great terminology, but your inference is your own.
A- O.K, demonstrate that the idea of deterrent exists somewhere within their brains.
B- Although it would be as alien as being a paperclip maximiser, say I deliberately want to know as little as possible. That would be a hypothetical goal for which science would not be useful.
As for how this counters Harris- Harris claims that some things are moral by definition and claims that proper morality is a subcategory of science. I counterargue that the fundamental differences between the nature of morality and the nature of science are problems with this categorisation.
I’m not sure if Harris’s health analogy is relevant enough to this part of the argument to put here, but it falls flat because health is relevant to far more potential human goals than morality is. Moral dilemnas in which a person has to choose between two possible moral values are plausibly enough adressed (though I have reservations) I’ll give him a pass on that one- but what about a situation where a person has to choose between acting selfishly and acting selflessly? You can say one is the moral choice by defintion depending on the definition of moral, but saying “It’s moral so do it” leads to the question “Why should I do what is moral”? With health people don’t actually question it because it tends to support their goals, although there is a similarity Harris and his critics do not appear to realise in that a person can and might ask “Why should I do what is healthy?” in some circumstances.
C- What I am trying to say argue with my psycopath analogy is that something can be good science without in any way being moral that Sam Harris would recognise as ‘moral’. The psycopath is in my scenario using the scientific method in every way except those which he can’t by definition given his goals- he even has a peer review commitee! His behaviour is therefore just as scientific as the scientist trying to, say, cure cancer.
D- I was only acting from what I read in his responses to the critics, which was my disclaimer from the start. I made a mistake, but I left open the possibility of such for lack of time.
Evolutionary game theory and punishment of defectors is all the answer you need. You want me to point at a deterrent region, somewhere to the left of Broca’s?
You say that science is useful for truths about the universe, whereas morality is useful for truths useful only to those interested in acting morally. It sounds like you agree with Harris that morality is a subcategory of science.
Still, so what? He’s not saying that all science is moral (in the sense of “benevolent” and “good for the world”). That would be ridiculous, and would be orthogonal to the argument of whether science can address questions of morality.
A- Not so. If the human does not consciously nor subconsciously care about deterrent, evolutionary reasons are irrelevant.
B- Only if, and this is a big if, you agree with the Elizier-Harris school of thought which say some things are morally true by definition. Because Harris agrees with him, I was granting him that as his own unique idea of what being moral is. However, at that point I was concerned with demonstrating morality cannot fit as a subcategory of science.
C- Harris appears to claim that there is a scientific basis for valuing wellbeing- he repudiates the hypothesis that there is none explicitly by claiming it comparable to the claim there is no scientific basis for valuing health.
This discussion isn’t getting anywhere, so, all the best :)