That’s possible. Or perhaps just a different theory of qualia (of which we don’t have a clear winner right now).
In my theory of experience, there are animals that have experiences of pain without the ability to model themselves, and for instance would react to a wound but not pass the mirror test.
would react to a wound but not pass the mirror test
I mean, reacting to a wound doesn’t demonstrate that they’re actually experiencing pain. If experiencing pain actually requires self-awareness, then an animal could be perfectly capable of avoiding damaging stimuli without actually feeling pain from said stimuli. I’m not saying that’s actually how it works, I’m just saying that reacting to wounds doesn’t demonstrate what you want it to demonstrate.
I strongly suspect this sentence is based on a confused understanding of qualia.
That’s possible. Or perhaps just a different theory of qualia (of which we don’t have a clear winner right now).
In my theory of experience, there are animals that have experiences of pain without the ability to model themselves, and for instance would react to a wound but not pass the mirror test.
I mean, reacting to a wound doesn’t demonstrate that they’re actually experiencing pain. If experiencing pain actually requires self-awareness, then an animal could be perfectly capable of avoiding damaging stimuli without actually feeling pain from said stimuli. I’m not saying that’s actually how it works, I’m just saying that reacting to wounds doesn’t demonstrate what you want it to demonstrate.
I agree that’s possible, it’s just also possible the reverse is true.