This is the type of thinking that can’t tell the difference between “a implies b” and “a, and also b”—because people almost always endorse both “a” and “b” when they say “a implies b”.
This is the type of thinking where disagreement tends to be regarded as a social attack, because disagreement is associated with social attack.
This is the type of thinking where we can’t ever have a phrase meaning “honestly” or “literally” or “no really, I’m not bulshitting you on this one” because if such a phrase existed then it would immediately be co-opted by everyone else as a mere intensifier.
This “type of thinking” sure seems very accurate to me.
In particular, the third paragraph quoted above seems spectacularly accurate, e.g. the euphemism treadmill.
Alice: “I just don’t understand why I don’t see Cedrick any more.”
Bob: “He’s married now.”
We infer from this that the marriage creates some kind of obstacle. Perhaps Cedrick is too busy to come over. Or Bob is implying that it would be inappropriate for Cedrick to frequently visit Alice, a single woman. None of this is literally said, but a cloud of conversational implicature surrounds the literal text. The signalling analysis can’t distinguish this cloud from the literal meaning.
I’m not sure this is quite true. Just because every utterance produces a ‘cloud of implicature’ doesn’t mean ‘literal meaning’ isn’t also a component of the signal.
And, in practice, it doesn’t seem like there is any general way to distinguish the cloud from the literal meaning. One problem being which literal meaning should be considered the literal meaning?
Like logical uncertainty, I see this as a challenge in the integration of logic and probability. In some sense, the signalling theory only allows for reasoning by association rather than structured logical reasoning, because the meaning of any particular thing is just its probabilistic associations.
I’m confused why this is a ‘challenge’ – or a surprising one anyways. It certainly seems (again!) astonishingly accurate to describe most people as “reasoning by association”.
Where do these crisp ontologies come from, if (under the signalling theory of meaning) symbols only have probabilistic meanings?
Wouldn’t they come from mostly (or ‘almost perfectly’) certain meanings? Practically, words seem to almost never correspond to a particularly crisp ontology (compare to, e.g. the elements or subject of a mathematical theory). I don’t think there’s any word that would – under all circumstances or in all situations – have a (unique) ‘literal meaning’.
The explanation of how communication can (reliably) convey ‘literal meanings’ seems to boil down to ‘with great effort, arbitrary depths of circumlocution, and (still) only ever approximately’.
This “type of thinking” sure seems very accurate to me.
In particular, the third paragraph quoted above seems spectacularly accurate, e.g. the euphemism treadmill.
OK, but I claim there is a difference between “literally” and a mere intensifier.
Also, people who can’t tell the difference between “A->B” and “A, and also B” are pretty frustrating to talk to.
I’m not sure this is quite true. Just because every utterance produces a ‘cloud of implicature’ doesn’t mean ‘literal meaning’ isn’t also a component of the signal.
And, in practice, it doesn’t seem like there is any general way to distinguish the cloud from the literal meaning. One problem being which literal meaning should be considered the literal meaning?
I totally agree that the literal meaning is a component.
I agree that there isn’t some general method to distinguish the cloud from the literal meaning, or pick out which literal meaning, but I claim people do anyway, sometimes making quite a strong distinction.
OK, but I claim there is a difference between “literally” and a mere intensifier.
I’m confused. Perhaps we’re writing past each other!
There is a meaning or sense of ‘literally’ that is not an intensifier – I believe this is true.
In most cases, for myself personally (and subject to all of the limitations of this kind of memory and for myself personally), I seem to be able to interpret specific uses of “literally” unambiguously.
There are occasional exceptions tho!
Also, people who can’t tell the difference between “A->B” and “A, and also B” are pretty frustrating to talk to.
I agree!
I agree that there isn’t some general method to distinguish the cloud from the literal meaning, or pick out which literal meaning, but I claim people do anyway, sometimes making quite a strong distinction.
I agree – people do it (pretty reliably) anyway and there can be arbitrarily strong distinctions maintained.
This “type of thinking” sure seems very accurate to me.
In particular, the third paragraph quoted above seems spectacularly accurate, e.g. the euphemism treadmill.
I’m not sure this is quite true. Just because every utterance produces a ‘cloud of implicature’ doesn’t mean ‘literal meaning’ isn’t also a component of the signal.
And, in practice, it doesn’t seem like there is any general way to distinguish the cloud from the literal meaning. One problem being which literal meaning should be considered the literal meaning?
I’m confused why this is a ‘challenge’ – or a surprising one anyways. It certainly seems (again!) astonishingly accurate to describe most people as “reasoning by association”.
Wouldn’t they come from mostly (or ‘almost perfectly’) certain meanings? Practically, words seem to almost never correspond to a particularly crisp ontology (compare to, e.g. the elements or subject of a mathematical theory). I don’t think there’s any word that would – under all circumstances or in all situations – have a (unique) ‘literal meaning’.
The explanation of how communication can (reliably) convey ‘literal meanings’ seems to boil down to ‘with great effort, arbitrary depths of circumlocution, and (still) only ever approximately’.
OK, but I claim there is a difference between “literally” and a mere intensifier.
Also, people who can’t tell the difference between “A->B” and “A, and also B” are pretty frustrating to talk to.
I totally agree that the literal meaning is a component.
I agree that there isn’t some general method to distinguish the cloud from the literal meaning, or pick out which literal meaning, but I claim people do anyway, sometimes making quite a strong distinction.
I’m confused. Perhaps we’re writing past each other!
There is a meaning or sense of ‘literally’ that is not an intensifier – I believe this is true.
In most cases, for myself personally (and subject to all of the limitations of this kind of memory and for myself personally), I seem to be able to interpret specific uses of “literally” unambiguously.
There are occasional exceptions tho!
I agree!
I agree – people do it (pretty reliably) anyway and there can be arbitrarily strong distinctions maintained.