In this case, I think the rational strategy is identical. If A and B are perfectly rational and have the same preferences, then assuming they didn’t both know the above two, they wold converge on the same strategy.
I believe that for any formal decision problem, a given level of information about that problem, and a given set of preferences, there is only one rational strategy (not a choice, but a strategy. The strategy may suggest a set of choices as opposed to any particular choice), but there is only one such strategy.
I speculate that everyone knows that if a single one of them switched to defect, then all of them would, so I doubt it.
However, I haven’t analysed how RDT works in prisoner dilemma games with n > 2, so I’m not sure.
In this case, I think the rational strategy is identical. If A and B are perfectly rational and have the same preferences, then assuming they didn’t both know the above two, they wold converge on the same strategy.
I believe that for any formal decision problem, a given level of information about that problem, and a given set of preferences, there is only one rational strategy (not a choice, but a strategy. The strategy may suggest a set of choices as opposed to any particular choice), but there is only one such strategy.
I speculate that everyone knows that if a single one of them switched to defect, then all of them would, so I doubt it.
However, I haven’t analysed how RDT works in prisoner dilemma games with n > 2, so I’m not sure.