Eliezer’s brand of humanism seems to consist in endorsing many of the values of traditional humanism while ditching the metaphysics. Jaron seemed to think the metaphysical stuff—specifically, psychological dualism of some sort—is indispensible. I’m not sure who should have proprietory rights over the word, but that argument is surely more about brand ownership rather than anything deep. And surely there’s little enough to recommend dualism in itself.
Jaron’s epistemic caution also struck me as being slightly odd. It’s one thing to beware delusion, accept the likelihood of substantial error and press on as best you can, revising beliefs where necessary. But Jaron seemed to be moving into more sceptical territory, saying in effect that if it seems P, that isn’t grounds for believing P—because of “epistemology”.
Can you unpack the stuff about consciousness, free-will and indeterminism a bit? Consciousness is the bit that’s usually taken as evidence for dualism. Why talk about the other things? Free will is a busted flush anyway, isn’t it? Never mind the intricacies of the physics; we automatically accept responsibility for bodily movements which have been artificially induced. I’m sure Jaron knows a great deal more about all this than I do but, from an interested outsider’s perspective, it isn’t at all clear how these notions are meant to hang together.
@ frelkins:
Eliezer’s brand of humanism seems to consist in endorsing many of the values of traditional humanism while ditching the metaphysics. Jaron seemed to think the metaphysical stuff—specifically, psychological dualism of some sort—is indispensible. I’m not sure who should have proprietory rights over the word, but that argument is surely more about brand ownership rather than anything deep. And surely there’s little enough to recommend dualism in itself.
Jaron’s epistemic caution also struck me as being slightly odd. It’s one thing to beware delusion, accept the likelihood of substantial error and press on as best you can, revising beliefs where necessary. But Jaron seemed to be moving into more sceptical territory, saying in effect that if it seems P, that isn’t grounds for believing P—because of “epistemology”.
Can you unpack the stuff about consciousness, free-will and indeterminism a bit? Consciousness is the bit that’s usually taken as evidence for dualism. Why talk about the other things? Free will is a busted flush anyway, isn’t it? Never mind the intricacies of the physics; we automatically accept responsibility for bodily movements which have been artificially induced. I’m sure Jaron knows a great deal more about all this than I do but, from an interested outsider’s perspective, it isn’t at all clear how these notions are meant to hang together.