But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it.
Well, no, it’s not. Because I am speaking about future events (ie: should we give aid or not), not past events.
I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help
I’m not. Current battlefield conditions suggest that the war will be a protracted stalemate favoring Russia absent strategically meaningful aid. And by strategically meaningful I mean either providing capabilities that allow retaking of territory or negating a long term weakness (say, shell or manpower shortages). But I digress. In any case, I’m arguing from the perspective of military capability, not as an expert, but as someone who is familiar with expert arguments (I could cite, for instance, oryx, the Insititute for the study of war, Perun, etc). Basic understanding of battlefield dynamics and conditions at a strategic level.
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
And here again… this doesn’t really address my point, mainly that statements 2 and 3 are essentially statements about relative strategic capability between two state actors, and this is neither domain level expert knowledge nor exceedingly complicated. You cannot argue, for instance, that the US does not have transatlantic power projection (aircraft carriers say hello). In the same way, you cannot argue Russia has a capability to win a quick and decisive war over Ukraine without western aid, because we saw them fail. Empirically speaking they lack a capability, and everyone who follows the conflict is aware of this.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does.
I feel like we’re going in circles now. It could be that I failed to make my points clearly, or you failed to understand them. But in any case my position is that matters of historical military capability (note historical: as in past tense, already occurred) is not up for debate. 2) and 3) fly in the face of it.
In any case I think this is a good place to discontinue, I don’t think we’re getting any benefit from further discussion.
Well, no, it’s not. Because I am speaking about future events (ie: should we give aid or not), not past events.
I’m not. Current battlefield conditions suggest that the war will be a protracted stalemate favoring Russia absent strategically meaningful aid. And by strategically meaningful I mean either providing capabilities that allow retaking of territory or negating a long term weakness (say, shell or manpower shortages). But I digress. In any case, I’m arguing from the perspective of military capability, not as an expert, but as someone who is familiar with expert arguments (I could cite, for instance, oryx, the Insititute for the study of war, Perun, etc). Basic understanding of battlefield dynamics and conditions at a strategic level.
And here again… this doesn’t really address my point, mainly that statements 2 and 3 are essentially statements about relative strategic capability between two state actors, and this is neither domain level expert knowledge nor exceedingly complicated. You cannot argue, for instance, that the US does not have transatlantic power projection (aircraft carriers say hello). In the same way, you cannot argue Russia has a capability to win a quick and decisive war over Ukraine without western aid, because we saw them fail. Empirically speaking they lack a capability, and everyone who follows the conflict is aware of this.
I feel like we’re going in circles now. It could be that I failed to make my points clearly, or you failed to understand them. But in any case my position is that matters of historical military capability (note historical: as in past tense, already occurred) is not up for debate. 2) and 3) fly in the face of it.
In any case I think this is a good place to discontinue, I don’t think we’re getting any benefit from further discussion.