I think the point was that it’s a cause you don’t have to be a longtermist in order to care about. Saying it’s a “longtermist cause” can be interpreted either as saying that there are strong reasons for caring about it if you’re a longtermist, or that there are not strong reasons for caring about it if you’re not a longtermist. OP is disagreeing with the second of these (i.e. OP thinks there are strong reasons for caring about AI risk completely apart from longtermism).
The whole point of EA is to be effective by analyzing the likely effects of actions. It’s in the name. OP writes:
Is this enough to justify working on AI X-risk from a purely selfish perspective?
Probably not—in the same way that it’s not selfish to work on climate change. The effect any one person can have on the issue is tiny, even if the magnitude that it affects any individual is fairly high.
But this does help it appeal to my deontological/virtue ethics side [...]
I don’t think one shouldn’t follow one’s virtue ethics, but I note that deontology / virtue ethics, on a consequentialist view, are good for when you don’t have clear models of things and ability to compare possible actions. E.g. you’re supposed to not murder people because you should know perfectly well that people who conclude they should murder people are mistaken empirically; so you should know that you don’t actually have a clear analysis of things. So as I said, there’s lots of reasons, such as virtue ethics, to want to work on AI risk. But the OP explicitly mentioned “longtermist cause” in the context of introducing AI risk as an EA cause; in terms of the consequentialist reasoning, longtermism is highly relevant! If you cared about your friends and family in addition to yourself, but didn’t care about your hypothetical future great-grandchildren and didn’t believe that your friends and family have a major stake in the long future, then it still wouldn’t be appealing to work on, right?
If by “virtue ethics” the OP means “because I also care about other people”, to me that seems like a consequentialist thing, and it might be useful for the OP to know that their behavior is actually consequentialist!
To be clear, I work on AI Safety for consequentialist reasons, and am aware that it seems overwhelmingly sensible from a longtermist perspective. I was trying to make the point that it also makes sense from a bunch of other perspectives, including perspectives that better feed in to my motivation system. It would still be worth working on even if this wasn’t the case, but I think it’s a point worth making.
I think the point was that it’s a cause you don’t have to be a longtermist in order to care about. Saying it’s a “longtermist cause” can be interpreted either as saying that there are strong reasons for caring about it if you’re a longtermist, or that there are not strong reasons for caring about it if you’re not a longtermist. OP is disagreeing with the second of these (i.e. OP thinks there are strong reasons for caring about AI risk completely apart from longtermism).
The whole point of EA is to be effective by analyzing the likely effects of actions. It’s in the name. OP writes:
I don’t think one shouldn’t follow one’s virtue ethics, but I note that deontology / virtue ethics, on a consequentialist view, are good for when you don’t have clear models of things and ability to compare possible actions. E.g. you’re supposed to not murder people because you should know perfectly well that people who conclude they should murder people are mistaken empirically; so you should know that you don’t actually have a clear analysis of things. So as I said, there’s lots of reasons, such as virtue ethics, to want to work on AI risk. But the OP explicitly mentioned “longtermist cause” in the context of introducing AI risk as an EA cause; in terms of the consequentialist reasoning, longtermism is highly relevant! If you cared about your friends and family in addition to yourself, but didn’t care about your hypothetical future great-grandchildren and didn’t believe that your friends and family have a major stake in the long future, then it still wouldn’t be appealing to work on, right?
If by “virtue ethics” the OP means “because I also care about other people”, to me that seems like a consequentialist thing, and it might be useful for the OP to know that their behavior is actually consequentialist!
To be clear, I work on AI Safety for consequentialist reasons, and am aware that it seems overwhelmingly sensible from a longtermist perspective. I was trying to make the point that it also makes sense from a bunch of other perspectives, including perspectives that better feed in to my motivation system. It would still be worth working on even if this wasn’t the case, but I think it’s a point worth making.