I tend to agree with mwengler—value is not a property of physical objects or world states, but a property of an observer having unequal preferences for different possible futures.
There is a risk we might be disagreeing because we are working with different interpretations of emotion.
Imagine a work of fiction involving no sentient beings, not even metaphorically—can you possibly write a happy or tragic ending? Is it not first when you introduce some form of intelligence with preferences that destruction becomes bad and serenity good? And are not preferences for this over that the same as emotion?
I tend to agree with mwengler—value is not a property of physical objects or world states, but a property of an observer having unequal preferences for different possible futures.
There is a risk we might be disagreeing because we are working with different interpretations of emotion.
Imagine a work of fiction involving no sentient beings, not even metaphorically—can you possibly write a happy or tragic ending? Is it not first when you introduce some form of intelligence with preferences that destruction becomes bad and serenity good? And are not preferences for this over that the same as emotion?