It seems like the key problem described here is that coalitions of rational people, when they form around scientific propositions, cause the group to become non-scientific out of desire to support the coalition. The example that springs to my mind is climate change, where there is social pressure for scientific-minded people (or even those who just approve of science) to back the rather specific policy of reducing greenhouse gas emissions rather than to probe other aspects of the problem or potential solutions and adaptations.
I wonder if we might solve problems like this by substituting some rational principle that is not subject to re-evaluation. Ultimate goals (CEV, or the like) would fit the bill in principle, but in practice, even if enough people could agree on them, I suspect they are too vague and remote to form a coalition around. The EA movement may be closer to succeeding, where the key idea is not an ultimate goal but rather the general technique of quantitatively evaluating opportunities to achieve altruistic objectives in general. Still, it’s difficult to extend a coalition like that to a broader population, since most people can’t easily identify with it.
Perhaps the middle ground is to start with a goal that is controversial enough to distinguish coalition members from outsiders, but too vague to form a strong coalition around—say, aggregative consequentialism or something. Then find a clear practical implication of the goal that has the necessary emotional impact. As long as the secondary goal follows easily enough from the first goal that it won’t need to be re-evaluated later on, the coalition can hold together and make progress toward the original goal without much danger of becoming irrational. Can’t think of a good example for the sub-goal, though.
It seems like the key problem described here is that coalitions of rational people, when they form around scientific propositions, cause the group to become non-scientific out of desire to support the coalition. The example that springs to my mind is climate change, where there is social pressure for scientific-minded people (or even those who just approve of science) to back the rather specific policy of reducing greenhouse gas emissions rather than to probe other aspects of the problem or potential solutions and adaptations.
I wonder if we might solve problems like this by substituting some rational principle that is not subject to re-evaluation. Ultimate goals (CEV, or the like) would fit the bill in principle, but in practice, even if enough people could agree on them, I suspect they are too vague and remote to form a coalition around. The EA movement may be closer to succeeding, where the key idea is not an ultimate goal but rather the general technique of quantitatively evaluating opportunities to achieve altruistic objectives in general. Still, it’s difficult to extend a coalition like that to a broader population, since most people can’t easily identify with it.
Perhaps the middle ground is to start with a goal that is controversial enough to distinguish coalition members from outsiders, but too vague to form a strong coalition around—say, aggregative consequentialism or something. Then find a clear practical implication of the goal that has the necessary emotional impact. As long as the secondary goal follows easily enough from the first goal that it won’t need to be re-evaluated later on, the coalition can hold together and make progress toward the original goal without much danger of becoming irrational. Can’t think of a good example for the sub-goal, though.