I was describing how I would respond in that situation. The amount I would give to charity XYZ is completely determined by my income. I need you to explain to me why this is wrong.
The amount I give to charity XYZ ought not be completely determined by my income. For example, if charity XYZ sets fire to all money donated to it, that fact also ought to figure into my decision of how much to donate to XYZ.
What ought to be determined by my income is my overall charity budget. Which charities I spend that budget on should be determined by properties of the charities themselves: specifically, by what they will accomplish with the money I donate to them.
For example, if charities XYZ and ABC both save birds, and I’m willing to spend $100 on saving birds, I still have to decide whether to donate that $100 to XYZ or ABC or some combination. One way to do this is to ask how many birds that $100 will save in each case… for example, if XYZ can save 10 birds with my $100, and ABC can save 100 birds, I should prefer to donate the money to ABC, since I save more birds that way.
Similarly, if it turns out that ABC can save 100 birds with $50, but can’t save a 101st bird no matter how much money I donate to ABC, I should prefer to donate only $50 to ABC.
Once upon a time, three groups of subjects were asked how much they would pay to save 2000 / 20000 / 200000 migrating birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups respectively answered $80, $78, and $88 [1]. This is scope insensitivity or scope neglect: the number of birds saved—the scope of the altruistic action—had little effect on willingness to pay.
Now I haven’t read the paper, but this implies there is only one charity doing the asking. First they ask how much you would give to save 2000 birds? You say, “$100.” Then they ask you the same thing again, just changing the number. You still say, “$100. It’s all I have.” So what’s wrong with that?
Agreed: if I assume that there’s a hard upper limit being externally imposed on those answers (e.g., that I only have $80, $78, and $88 to spend in the first place, and that even the least valuable of the three choices is worth more to me than everything I have to spend) then those answers don’t demonstrate interesting scope insensitivity.
There’s nothing wrong with that conclusion, given those assumptions.
I was describing how I would respond in that situation. The amount I would give to charity XYZ is completely determined by my income. I need you to explain to me why this is wrong.
OK, if you insist.
The amount I give to charity XYZ ought not be completely determined by my income. For example, if charity XYZ sets fire to all money donated to it, that fact also ought to figure into my decision of how much to donate to XYZ.
What ought to be determined by my income is my overall charity budget. Which charities I spend that budget on should be determined by properties of the charities themselves: specifically, by what they will accomplish with the money I donate to them.
For example, if charities XYZ and ABC both save birds, and I’m willing to spend $100 on saving birds, I still have to decide whether to donate that $100 to XYZ or ABC or some combination. One way to do this is to ask how many birds that $100 will save in each case… for example, if XYZ can save 10 birds with my $100, and ABC can save 100 birds, I should prefer to donate the money to ABC, since I save more birds that way.
Similarly, if it turns out that ABC can save 100 birds with $50, but can’t save a 101st bird no matter how much money I donate to ABC, I should prefer to donate only $50 to ABC.
From Scope Insensitivity:
Now I haven’t read the paper, but this implies there is only one charity doing the asking. First they ask how much you would give to save 2000 birds? You say, “$100.” Then they ask you the same thing again, just changing the number. You still say, “$100. It’s all I have.” So what’s wrong with that?
Agreed: if I assume that there’s a hard upper limit being externally imposed on those answers (e.g., that I only have $80, $78, and $88 to spend in the first place, and that even the least valuable of the three choices is worth more to me than everything I have to spend) then those answers don’t demonstrate interesting scope insensitivity.
There’s nothing wrong with that conclusion, given those assumptions.