I think one has to look at what one can “afford” on different time scales. The answer can be quite different in the short run than with more time.
Of course, technically you are right. Germany could afford harsh sanctions against Russia even in the short term, in the sense that it will not be the end of Germany. However, living in Germany, I like to have electricity. And in winter I do like to have heating, too (the building I am living in is heated with natural gas—gas has a market share for heating of 48% in Germany, and district heating 14%, from which 42% are produced by gas, too). It is not only about “higher gas prices”—without Russian gas (and Russian coal) it is questionable if there will be enough energy available for electricity production and heating.
So, the main problem from my perspective isn’t the short term reluctance to risk Germany’s energy supply. The problem is that Germany has allowed itself to be dependent on such a highly unreliable energy source as Russia. And that one hasn’t invested in at least the option to use alternative sources, e.g., building a LNG terminal to be able to import gas from other sources (US, Qatar) - I believe mostly due to ideological reasons (gas is “bad” because it is a fossile fuel). And less than two months ago three additional nuclear power plants were shut down on schedule while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was heating up.
When it comes to defense spending I believe there are different reasons for Germany’s unwillingness to do more: One factor is a highly naive reliance on an idealistic theory of foreign relations (that morality and international law trump national interests). Another factor is that it has worked in the past—during the cold war there was constant complaining by the US that the European countries should do more to defend themselves. Then there is the feeling that the threat to Germany is much less than during the cold war, Putin’s Russia is not seen as having aspirations to conquer Germany or all of Europe—quite different from the universalistic ideology of communism or from Hitler’s territorial aims (and I believe that assessment is actually somewhat correct—for Russia a neutral Germany would be more beneficial than a Germany under Russian rule—as with Sweden’s neutrality for Germany during WWII ). And, as a result of two lost world wars, Germany has become deeply pacifistic. All those reasons have led to a motivated blindness towards Putin’s aims and actions. I am quite curious whether this will change now (but I somehow doubt it).
I think one has to look at what one can “afford” on different time scales. The answer can be quite different in the short run than with more time.
Of course, technically you are right. Germany could afford harsh sanctions against Russia even in the short term, in the sense that it will not be the end of Germany. However, living in Germany, I like to have electricity. And in winter I do like to have heating, too (the building I am living in is heated with natural gas—gas has a market share for heating of 48% in Germany, and district heating 14%, from which 42% are produced by gas, too). It is not only about “higher gas prices”—without Russian gas (and Russian coal) it is questionable if there will be enough energy available for electricity production and heating.
So, the main problem from my perspective isn’t the short term reluctance to risk Germany’s energy supply. The problem is that Germany has allowed itself to be dependent on such a highly unreliable energy source as Russia. And that one hasn’t invested in at least the option to use alternative sources, e.g., building a LNG terminal to be able to import gas from other sources (US, Qatar) - I believe mostly due to ideological reasons (gas is “bad” because it is a fossile fuel). And less than two months ago three additional nuclear power plants were shut down on schedule while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was heating up.
When it comes to defense spending I believe there are different reasons for Germany’s unwillingness to do more: One factor is a highly naive reliance on an idealistic theory of foreign relations (that morality and international law trump national interests). Another factor is that it has worked in the past—during the cold war there was constant complaining by the US that the European countries should do more to defend themselves. Then there is the feeling that the threat to Germany is much less than during the cold war, Putin’s Russia is not seen as having aspirations to conquer Germany or all of Europe—quite different from the universalistic ideology of communism or from Hitler’s territorial aims (and I believe that assessment is actually somewhat correct—for Russia a neutral Germany would be more beneficial than a Germany under Russian rule—as with Sweden’s neutrality for Germany during WWII ). And, as a result of two lost world wars, Germany has become deeply pacifistic. All those reasons have led to a motivated blindness towards Putin’s aims and actions. I am quite curious whether this will change now (but I somehow doubt it).