So, according to Freedom House, countries with nonviolent revolutions since the late 1990s are improving. There’s not a lot of data beforehand. You named the exception: Georgia’s gotten a little worse since the overthrow of the “rigged” election there. Look at the data: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=42&year=2008
I’m willing to admit I might have some Western bias, but I try to catch it. The general consensus does seem to be that the elections were rigged, but I don’t know enough to say with much confidence either way.
In my original post, I was referring to the period of actual revolution, not everything since. I know it’s not all sunshine and rainbows. Reality is gritty, nasty stuff. Nonviolent struggle strategy and tactics do not guarantee success nor democracy—but neither do violent methods.
If we’re discussing strategies and tactics, most nonviolent movements do not plan much past overthrow. That’s bad, but again, no worse than violent overthrow.
These are big and fuzzy concepts, for sure. When does a revolution actually end? If a less or equally undemocratic leader is elected, is that a failure of nonviolent struggle, a failure or planning, a failure of the people, or what? Are Freedom House’s metrics valid or consistent? I don’t have good answers.
If you were to wager on whether strategic nonviolent or strategic violent struggles in the modern day were more likely to lead toward a successful overthrow, how would you bet? What about leading toward more democratic overthrows (i.e. elections)?
So, according to Freedom House, countries with nonviolent revolutions since the late 1990s are improving. There’s not a lot of data beforehand. You named the exception: Georgia’s gotten a little worse since the overthrow of the “rigged” election there. Look at the data: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=42&year=2008
I’m willing to admit I might have some Western bias, but I try to catch it. The general consensus does seem to be that the elections were rigged, but I don’t know enough to say with much confidence either way.
In my original post, I was referring to the period of actual revolution, not everything since. I know it’s not all sunshine and rainbows. Reality is gritty, nasty stuff. Nonviolent struggle strategy and tactics do not guarantee success nor democracy—but neither do violent methods.
If we’re discussing strategies and tactics, most nonviolent movements do not plan much past overthrow. That’s bad, but again, no worse than violent overthrow.
These are big and fuzzy concepts, for sure. When does a revolution actually end? If a less or equally undemocratic leader is elected, is that a failure of nonviolent struggle, a failure or planning, a failure of the people, or what? Are Freedom House’s metrics valid or consistent? I don’t have good answers.
If you were to wager on whether strategic nonviolent or strategic violent struggles in the modern day were more likely to lead toward a successful overthrow, how would you bet? What about leading toward more democratic overthrows (i.e. elections)?