It also seems like there’s an argument for weighting urgency in planning that could lead to ‘distorted’ timelines while being a rational response to uncertainty.
It’s important to do the “what are all the possible outcomes and what are the probabilities of each” calculation before you start thinking about weightings of how bad/good various outcomes are.
Could you say more about what you mean here? I don’t quite see the connection between your comment and the point that was quoted.
I understand the quoted bit to be pointing out that if you don’t know when a disaster is coming you _might_ want to prioritize preparing for it coming sooner rather than later (e.g. since there’s a future you who will be available to prepare for the disaster if it comes in the future, but you’re the only you available to prepare for it if it comes tomorrow).
Of course you could make a counter-argument that perhaps you can’t do much of anything in the case where disaster is coming soon, but in the long-run your actions can compound, so you should focus on long-term scenarios. But the quoted bit is only saying that there’s “an argument”, and doesn’t seem to be making a strong claim about which way it comes out in the final analysis.
Was your comment meaning to suggest the possibility of a counter-argument like this one, or something else? Did you interpret the bit you quoted the same way I did?
It’s important to do the “what are all the possible outcomes and what are the probabilities of each” calculation before you start thinking about weightings of how bad/good various outcomes are.
Could you say more about what you mean here? I don’t quite see the connection between your comment and the point that was quoted.
I understand the quoted bit to be pointing out that if you don’t know when a disaster is coming you _might_ want to prioritize preparing for it coming sooner rather than later (e.g. since there’s a future you who will be available to prepare for the disaster if it comes in the future, but you’re the only you available to prepare for it if it comes tomorrow).
Of course you could make a counter-argument that perhaps you can’t do much of anything in the case where disaster is coming soon, but in the long-run your actions can compound, so you should focus on long-term scenarios. But the quoted bit is only saying that there’s “an argument”, and doesn’t seem to be making a strong claim about which way it comes out in the final analysis.
Was your comment meaning to suggest the possibility of a counter-argument like this one, or something else? Did you interpret the bit you quoted the same way I did?
Basically, don’t let your thinking on what is useful affect your thinking on what’s likely.