The comment has since been expanded into the (unofficial) Moral Realism sequence. I cover a bunch of issues, including the (often not recognised) distinction between prescriptive and non-prescriptive anti realism—which is an issue that is relevant to some important factual questions (as it overlaps with the ‘realism about rationality’ issue driving some debates in AI safety), whether we need normative facts and what difference convergence of moral views may or may not make.
The goal here was to explain what moral realists like about moral realism—for those who are perplexed about why it would be worth wanting or how anyone could find it plausible, and explain what things depend on it being right or wrong, and how you may or may not retain some of the features of realism (like universalizability) if different anti-realist views are true.
The comment has since been expanded into the (unofficial) Moral Realism sequence. I cover a bunch of issues, including the (often not recognised) distinction between prescriptive and non-prescriptive anti realism—which is an issue that is relevant to some important factual questions (as it overlaps with the ‘realism about rationality’ issue driving some debates in AI safety), whether we need normative facts and what difference convergence of moral views may or may not make.
Normative Realism by Degrees
Normative Anti-realism is self-defeating
Normativity and recursive justification
Prescriptive Anti-realism
The goal here was to explain what moral realists like about moral realism—for those who are perplexed about why it would be worth wanting or how anyone could find it plausible, and explain what things depend on it being right or wrong, and how you may or may not retain some of the features of realism (like universalizability) if different anti-realist views are true.