I finished “Thinking fast and slow” a few days ago, and I have remarks.
1) You say
The terms “System 1 and System 2” suggest just that: two distinct, clearly defined systems with their own distinctive properties and modes of operation.
Kahneman is aware of that and tries to prevent it. A quote from the conclusion of the book :
And of course you also remember that the two systems do not really exist in the brain or anywhere else. “System 1 does X” is a shortcut for “X occurs automatically.” And “System 2 is mobilized to do Y” is a shortcut for “arousal increases, pupils dilate, attention is focused, and activity Y is performed.”
2) Either there is something I don’t understand ir the examples taken by Melnikoff & Bargh (2018) seem to lack charity. In the bat-and-ball problem, the task of “computing the price of the ball by substracting the total cost and the difference between the two prices” is unintentional, there is not a moment when it was decided. This is what is meant by “the task is performed unintentionnaly”. Similarly, in the availability heuristic the task “estimate whether more words begin with the letter K than have K in the third position by assessing how many words with each I can remember” is not intentional. The substitution, attributed to System 1, is not intentional.
3) I don’t know if the quotes from Evans (2012) are directed toward Kahneman, but “why should [type 2] reasoning necessarily be normatively correct? [...] why should type 1 processes that operate automatically and without reflection necessarily be wrong ?” has nothing to do with what the book says, and you explain quite well why System 1 will make more mistakes. I don’t see what this adds to the rest
4) Similarly, there are two chapters of Thinking Fast and Slow (21 and 22) dedicated to the good and bad of expert intuitions, so the remark about “there is much evidence that expert decision making can often be well served by intuitive rather than reflective thinking” seems out of place
I found your text interesting and quite informative but I don’t want people to have the idea that Thinking Fast and Slow is letting important things like this slip.
I finished “Thinking fast and slow” a few days ago, and I have remarks.
1) You say
Kahneman is aware of that and tries to prevent it. A quote from the conclusion of the book :
2) Either there is something I don’t understand ir the examples taken by Melnikoff & Bargh (2018) seem to lack charity. In the bat-and-ball problem, the task of “computing the price of the ball by substracting the total cost and the difference between the two prices” is unintentional, there is not a moment when it was decided. This is what is meant by “the task is performed unintentionnaly”. Similarly, in the availability heuristic the task “estimate whether more words begin with the letter K than have K in the third position by assessing how many words with each I can remember” is not intentional. The substitution, attributed to System 1, is not intentional.
3) I don’t know if the quotes from Evans (2012) are directed toward Kahneman, but “why should [type 2] reasoning necessarily be normatively correct? [...] why should type 1 processes that operate automatically and without reflection necessarily be wrong ?” has nothing to do with what the book says, and you explain quite well why System 1 will make more mistakes. I don’t see what this adds to the rest
4) Similarly, there are two chapters of Thinking Fast and Slow (21 and 22) dedicated to the good and bad of expert intuitions, so the remark about “there is much evidence that expert decision making can often be well served by intuitive rather than reflective thinking” seems out of place
I found your text interesting and quite informative but I don’t want people to have the idea that Thinking Fast and Slow is letting important things like this slip.