I really don’t like the pragmatic argument against the simulation hypothesis. It demonstrates a common theme in anthropics which IMO is misleading the majority of discussions. By saying pre-simulation ancestors have impacts on how the singularity plays out therefore we ought to make decisions as if we are real pre-simulation people, it subtly shifts the objective of our decisions. Instead of the default objective of maximizing reward to ourselves, doing what’s best for us in our world, it changes the objective to achieve a certain state of the universe concerning all the worlds, real and simulations.
These two objectives do not necessarily coincide. They may even demand conflicting decisions. Yet it is very common for people to argue that self-locating uncertainty ought to be treated a certain way because it would result in rational decisions with the latter objective.
I really don’t like the pragmatic argument against the simulation hypothesis. It demonstrates a common theme in anthropics which IMO is misleading the majority of discussions. By saying pre-simulation ancestors have impacts on how the singularity plays out therefore we ought to make decisions as if we are real pre-simulation people, it subtly shifts the objective of our decisions. Instead of the default objective of maximizing reward to ourselves, doing what’s best for us in our world, it changes the objective to achieve a certain state of the universe concerning all the worlds, real and simulations.
These two objectives do not necessarily coincide. They may even demand conflicting decisions. Yet it is very common for people to argue that self-locating uncertainty ought to be treated a certain way because it would result in rational decisions with the latter objective.