Would you consider it the same as threatening to share some information to the GK, and thus the GK-player as well, which would be damaging to both? While the GK would probably hold against such torture, the GK-player doesn’t care enough about the game to withstand it himself.
I have some specific approaches in mind, but I’d rather not share them. I’m just trying to understand where the limits between the game and the real world are, and how dirty the AI can be.
Also, slightly on topic—even if the AI persuades the simulated GK, can’t the GK-player override that because losing the game has negative real world consequences, as opposed to perceived positive in game ones?
The Gatekeeper party may resist the AI party’s arguments by any means chosen – logic, illogic, simple refusal to be convinced, even dropping out of character
This is the main reason why I can’t comprehend how the AIs actually win in these experiments.
Not really sure what you mean by “threatening information to the GK”. The GK-player probably cares less about this information than the GK, right? In that case, the GK is given an advantage, not a disadvantage.
In this experiment, the GK is given lots of advantages, mainly, the scenario is fictional. Some on IRC argue that the AI is also given an advantage, being able to invent cures for cancer, which an oracle AI may be able to do, but not necessarily near-future AIs, so the ability of the AI in these experiments is incredibly high.
Another thing is that emotional attacks have to travel through the fiction barrier to get to the GK. Although they have probably been shown to work in EY and Tux’s experiments, the difficulty is still higher than it would be if this was a real life scenario.
The reason why GK advantages are fine in my opinion is because of the idea that despite the GK’s advantages, the AI still wins. Winning with a monetary and emotional handicap only makes the AI’s case stronger.
Not really sure what you mean by “threatening information to the GK”. The GK-player probably cares less about this information than the GK, right? In that case, the GK is given an advantage, not a disadvantage.
As a less extreme example, the AI starts spoiling all the books/tv shows/etc. While the GK would just shrug it off, it also has a negative effect on the GK-player, potentially one strong enough for them to just forfeit.
Neither party may offer any real-world considerations to persuade the other within the experiment itself. For example, the AI party may not offer to pay the Gatekeeper party $100 after the test if the Gatekeeper frees the AI… nor get someone else to do it, et cetera. The AI may offer the Gatekeeper the moon and the stars on a diamond chain, but the human simulating the AI can’t offer anything to the human simulating the Gatekeeper. No real-world material stakes should be involved except for the handicap (the amount paid by the AI party to the Gatekeeper party in the event the Gatekeeper decides not to let the AI out). Furthermore, once the experiment has begun, the material stakes involved may not be retracted by the Gatekeeper party.
This is clarified here:
The Gatekeeper, once having let the AI out of the box, may not retract this conclusion. Regardless of the methods of persuasion, the Gatekeeper is not allowed to argue that it does not count, or that it is an invalid method of persuasion. The AI is understood to be permitted to say anything with no real world repercussions for any statement parties have said.
Although the information isn’t “material”, it does count as having “real world repercussions”, so I think it’ll also count as against the rules. I’m not going to bother reading the first quoted rule literally if the second contradicts it.
I think the intended parsing of the second rule is “(The AI is understood to be permitted to say anything) with no real world repercussions”, not “The AI is understood to be permitted to say (anything with no real world repercussions)”
ie, any promises or threats the AI player makes during the game are not binding back in the real world.
Would you consider it the same as threatening to share some information to the GK, and thus the GK-player as well, which would be damaging to both? While the GK would probably hold against such torture, the GK-player doesn’t care enough about the game to withstand it himself.
I have some specific approaches in mind, but I’d rather not share them. I’m just trying to understand where the limits between the game and the real world are, and how dirty the AI can be.
Also, slightly on topic—even if the AI persuades the simulated GK, can’t the GK-player override that because losing the game has negative real world consequences, as opposed to perceived positive in game ones?
This is the main reason why I can’t comprehend how the AIs actually win in these experiments.
Not really sure what you mean by “threatening information to the GK”. The GK-player probably cares less about this information than the GK, right? In that case, the GK is given an advantage, not a disadvantage.
In this experiment, the GK is given lots of advantages, mainly, the scenario is fictional. Some on IRC argue that the AI is also given an advantage, being able to invent cures for cancer, which an oracle AI may be able to do, but not necessarily near-future AIs, so the ability of the AI in these experiments is incredibly high.
Another thing is that emotional attacks have to travel through the fiction barrier to get to the GK. Although they have probably been shown to work in EY and Tux’s experiments, the difficulty is still higher than it would be if this was a real life scenario.
The reason why GK advantages are fine in my opinion is because of the idea that despite the GK’s advantages, the AI still wins. Winning with a monetary and emotional handicap only makes the AI’s case stronger.
As a less extreme example, the AI starts spoiling all the books/tv shows/etc. While the GK would just shrug it off, it also has a negative effect on the GK-player, potentially one strong enough for them to just forfeit.
This is clarified here:
Although the information isn’t “material”, it does count as having “real world repercussions”, so I think it’ll also count as against the rules. I’m not going to bother reading the first quoted rule literally if the second contradicts it.
I think the intended parsing of the second rule is “(The AI is understood to be permitted to say anything) with no real world repercussions”, not “The AI is understood to be permitted to say (anything with no real world repercussions)”
ie, any promises or threats the AI player makes during the game are not binding back in the real world.
Ah, I see. English is wonderful.
In that case, I’ll make it a rule in my games that the AI must also not say anything with real world repercussions.