Example: Most people would save a young child instead of an old person if forced to choose, and it is not not just because the baby has more years left, part of the reason is because it seems unfair for the young child to die sooner than the old person.
As far as I’m concerned it is just because the baby has more years left. If I had to choose between a healthy old person with several expected years of happy and productive life left, versus a child who was terminally ill and going to die in a year regardless, I’d save the old person. It is unfair that an innocent person should ever have to die, and unfairness is not diminished merely by afflicting everyone equally.
Suppose old person and child (perhaps better: young adult) would both gain 2 years, so we equalize payoff. What then? Why not be prioritarian at the margin of aggregate indifference?
As far as I’m concerned it is just because the baby has more years left. If I had to choose between a healthy old person with several expected years of happy and productive life left, versus a child who was terminally ill and going to die in a year regardless, I’d save the old person. It is unfair that an innocent person should ever have to die, and unfairness is not diminished merely by afflicting everyone equally.
Suppose old person and child (perhaps better: young adult) would both gain 2 years, so we equalize payoff. What then? Why not be prioritarian at the margin of aggregate indifference?
Well, young adults typically enjoy life more*, so...
* I’ve heard old people saying they wish they could become young again, but I haven’t heard any young people saying they can’t wait to become old.