I vaguely remember OpenAI citing US law as a reason they don’t allow Chinese users access, maybe legislation passed as part of the chip ban?
Nah, the export controls don’t cover this sort of thing. They just cover chips, devices that contain chips (i.e. GPUs and AI ASICs), and equipment/materials/software/information used to make those. (I don’t know the actual reason for OpenAI’s not allowing Chinese customers, though.)
I don’t know the actual reason for OpenAI’s not allowing Chinese customers, though.
Any online service hosted outside of mainland China wanting to sell within has to meet quite onerous regulations. I’ve thought about for some time why these exist and develop to the extent that it’s harmful (and why they exist nearly everywhere).
It’s partly by design, similar to the EU’s regulatory apparatus that created GDPR, partly because of the natural distrust of government officials towards the intentions of foreign actors, but also because of the office dynamics.
As scoring points against foreigners is low hanging fruit for the career prospects of middle-management government officials in many, many, government offices.
If their attempts succeed in delivering proof of misdeeds, or a public apology, then it’s a guaranteed promotion.
If their attempts fail, how will the overseas stakeholders retaliate against these nameless official(s) without pointing the finger at the department/division/ministry/government/China… as a whole?
If they do anyways, it would turn into a status fight, thus facilitating a promotion for whoever proposed it.
And then some stricter regulations will be imposed as retaliation, which increases the power and authority of the instigators.
i.e. In either case the instigator wins, so it becomes a ratcheting mechanism that encourages ever more extreme proposals and tit-for-tat behaviour, and that’s even before the geopolitics come into play
In this sense increasing geopolitical tension might ironically reduce the day-to-day risk of being on the unfortunate end of such schemes, since higher level officials will be extra motivated to make sure their subordinates are more disciplined.
Nah, the export controls don’t cover this sort of thing. They just cover chips, devices that contain chips (i.e. GPUs and AI ASICs), and equipment/materials/software/information used to make those. (I don’t know the actual reason for OpenAI’s not allowing Chinese customers, though.)
Any online service hosted outside of mainland China wanting to sell within has to meet quite onerous regulations. I’ve thought about for some time why these exist and develop to the extent that it’s harmful (and why they exist nearly everywhere).
It’s partly by design, similar to the EU’s regulatory apparatus that created GDPR, partly because of the natural distrust of government officials towards the intentions of foreign actors, but also because of the office dynamics.
As scoring points against foreigners is low hanging fruit for the career prospects of middle-management government officials in many, many, government offices.
If their attempts succeed in delivering proof of misdeeds, or a public apology, then it’s a guaranteed promotion.
If their attempts fail, how will the overseas stakeholders retaliate against these nameless official(s) without pointing the finger at the department/division/ministry/government/China… as a whole?
If they do anyways, it would turn into a status fight, thus facilitating a promotion for whoever proposed it.
And then some stricter regulations will be imposed as retaliation, which increases the power and authority of the instigators.
i.e. In either case the instigator wins, so it becomes a ratcheting mechanism that encourages ever more extreme proposals and tit-for-tat behaviour, and that’s even before the geopolitics come into play
In this sense increasing geopolitical tension might ironically reduce the day-to-day risk of being on the unfortunate end of such schemes, since higher level officials will be extra motivated to make sure their subordinates are more disciplined.