I think these examples are consistent with my views: Sometimes public goods are provided because the demand for them is so great they people overcome the co-ordination problem or just allow people to free-ride (lighthouses) or sometimes public goods are not that public (bee pollination) and so private enterprises pay for them for very little free-riding.
The problem is not the public-goods are never provided, but that the are under-provided: either they are not provided or are of low-quality relative to what is economically efficient.
but that the are under-provided: either they are not provided or are of low-quality relative to what is economically efficient.
I find that bit something of a problematic claim.
If economic efficiency is the criteria one has to show that marginal costs and marginal values are misaligned. I’m not sure that is the general case. The claimed misalignment seems to be based on one of 2 general propositions: 1) that people will choose a persistently worse position over a better one or 2) Increasing the output of any good will be beneficial. In the first case I don’t think such situations last very long. In the latter, it seems based on some partial equilibrium analysis that is ignoring the opportunity costs of the resources shifted to increase the output of the public good.
I do agree that coordination costs can be a factor in production of public goods but considering what institutional setting can best reduce the coordination costs—thereby making the production possible/increased—is the question. I think both mentioned articles, and others present in the book, point out that largely private settings have found ways to accomplish the coordination side.
I think these examples are consistent with my views: Sometimes public goods are provided because the demand for them is so great they people overcome the co-ordination problem or just allow people to free-ride (lighthouses) or sometimes public goods are not that public (bee pollination) and so private enterprises pay for them for very little free-riding.
The problem is not the public-goods are never provided, but that the are under-provided: either they are not provided or are of low-quality relative to what is economically efficient.
I find that bit something of a problematic claim.
If economic efficiency is the criteria one has to show that marginal costs and marginal values are misaligned. I’m not sure that is the general case. The claimed misalignment seems to be based on one of 2 general propositions: 1) that people will choose a persistently worse position over a better one or 2) Increasing the output of any good will be beneficial. In the first case I don’t think such situations last very long. In the latter, it seems based on some partial equilibrium analysis that is ignoring the opportunity costs of the resources shifted to increase the output of the public good.
I do agree that coordination costs can be a factor in production of public goods but considering what institutional setting can best reduce the coordination costs—thereby making the production possible/increased—is the question. I think both mentioned articles, and others present in the book, point out that largely private settings have found ways to accomplish the coordination side.