I generally don’t read links when there’s no context provided, and think it’s almost always worth it (from a cooperative perspective) to provide a bit of context.
Can you give me a TL;DR of why this is relevant or what your point is in posting this link?
The post answers to what extent safely tuning that trade-off is feasible, and the surrounding sequence motivates that penalization scheme in greater generality. From Conclusion to ‘Reframing Impact’:
The TL;DR seems to be: “We only need a lower bound on the catastrophe/reasonable impact ratio, and an idea about how much utility is available for reasonable plans.”
This seems good… can you confirm my understanding below is correct?
2) RE: “How much utility is available”: I guess we can just set a targeted level of utility gain, and it won’t matter if there are plans we’d consider reasonable that would exceed that level? (e.g. “I’d be happy if we can make 50% more paperclips at the same cost in the next year.”)
1) RE: “A lower bound”: this seems good because we don’t need to know how extreme catastrophes could be, we can just say: “If (e.g.) the earth or the human species ceased to exist as we know it within the year, that would be catastrophic”.
See How Low Should Fruit Hang Before We Pick It?.
I generally don’t read links when there’s no context provided, and think it’s almost always worth it (from a cooperative perspective) to provide a bit of context.
Can you give me a TL;DR of why this is relevant or what your point is in posting this link?
The post answers to what extent safely tuning that trade-off is feasible, and the surrounding sequence motivates that penalization scheme in greater generality. From Conclusion to ‘Reframing Impact’:
OK, thanks.
The TL;DR seems to be: “We only need a lower bound on the catastrophe/reasonable impact ratio, and an idea about how much utility is available for reasonable plans.”
This seems good… can you confirm my understanding below is correct?
2) RE: “How much utility is available”: I guess we can just set a targeted level of utility gain, and it won’t matter if there are plans we’d consider reasonable that would exceed that level? (e.g. “I’d be happy if we can make 50% more paperclips at the same cost in the next year.”)
1) RE: “A lower bound”: this seems good because we don’t need to know how extreme catastrophes could be, we can just say: “If (e.g.) the earth or the human species ceased to exist as we know it within the year, that would be catastrophic”.
That’s correct.