Why would I want to change a person’s belief if they already value philosophical solutions? I think people should value philosophical solutions. I value them.
Maybe I’m misunderstanding your question.
It seemed like the poster above stated they do not value philosophical solutions. The paper isn’t really aimed at converting a person that doesn’t value ‘the why’ into a person that does. It is aimed at people which already do care about ‘the why’ and are looking to further reinforce/challenge their beliefs about what induction is capable of doing.
The principle of uniformity of nature is something we need to assume if we are going to declare we have evidence that the tenth swan to come out of the box would be white (in the situation where we have a box of ten swans and have observed 9 of them come out of the box and be white). Hume successfully convinced me that this can’t be done without assuming the principle of uniformity in nature.
What I am claiming though, is that although we have no evidence to support the assertion ‘The 10th swan will be white.’ we do have evidence to support the assertion ‘All ten swans in the box will be white.’ (an assertion made before we opened the box.). This justification is not dependent upon assuming the principle of uniformity of nature.
In general, it is a clarification specifically about what induction is capable of producing justification for.
Future observation instances? No.
But general statements? I think this is plausible.
It’s really just an inquiry into what counts as justification.
Why would I want to change a person’s belief if they already value philosophical solutions? I think people should value philosophical solutions. I value them.
Maybe I’m misunderstanding your question.
It seemed like the poster above stated they do not value philosophical solutions. The paper isn’t really aimed at converting a person that doesn’t value ‘the why’ into a person that does. It is aimed at people which already do care about ‘the why’ and are looking to further reinforce/challenge their beliefs about what induction is capable of doing.
The principle of uniformity of nature is something we need to assume if we are going to declare we have evidence that the tenth swan to come out of the box would be white (in the situation where we have a box of ten swans and have observed 9 of them come out of the box and be white). Hume successfully convinced me that this can’t be done without assuming the principle of uniformity in nature.
What I am claiming though, is that although we have no evidence to support the assertion ‘The 10th swan will be white.’ we do have evidence to support the assertion ‘All ten swans in the box will be white.’ (an assertion made before we opened the box.). This justification is not dependent upon assuming the principle of uniformity of nature.
In general, it is a clarification specifically about what induction is capable of producing justification for.
Future observation instances? No.
But general statements? I think this is plausible.
It’s really just an inquiry into what counts as justification.
Necessary or sufficient evidence.