The problem with this is that people use the word “superintelligence” without a precise definition. Clearly they mean some computational process. But nobody who uses the term colloquially defines it.
So, I will make the assertion that if a computational process achieves the best possible outcome for you, it is a superintelligence. I don’t think anyone would disagree with that.
If you do, please state what other properties you think a “superintelligence” must have other than being a computational process achieves the best possible outcome.
If you are interested in convincing people who so far think “It is impossible for the existence of an artificial superintelligence to produce desirable outcomes” otherwise, you should have a meaning of “an aritifical superintelligence” in mind that is like what they mean by it.
If one suspects that it is impossible for an artificial superintelligence to produce desirable outcomes, then when one considers “among possible futures, the one(s) that have as good or better outcomes than any other possible future”, one would suppose that these perhaps are not ones that contain superintelligences. And, so, one would suppose that the computational process that achieves the best outcome, would perhaps not be a superintelligence.
To convince such a person otherwise, you would have to establish that some properties that they consider characteristic of something being a superintelligence (which would probably be something like “is more intelligent and competent than any human” for some specified sense of “intelligent”) is compatible with achieving good (or maximally good) outcomes.
If someone suspects that [insert name of some not-particularly-well-defined political ideology here] can’t ever lead to good outcomes, it would not convince them otherwise to go through the same argument except with “government procedure” or whatever in place of the actuators and such of the computer program, and say that:
“Clearly it is possible for a government process to do the best that can be done by any government process. Then, such a government must count as [insert aforementioned name of a not very well-defined ideology] government, as it achieves all the things that someone who wants a [insert aforementioned name of a not very well-defined ideology] government could hope it would achieve. Therefore, it is possible for a [insert aforementioned name of a not very well-defined ideology] government to do the best that can be done by any government procedure.”
, they would not find this compelling in the slightest! They would object that [insert aforementioned name of a not very well defined ideology] generally has properties P and Q, and that you haven’t established that the P or Q are compatible with achieving the best that a government can achieve.
This would still be the case if P and Q are somewhat fuzzy concepts without a clear consensus on how to make them precise.
And, they would be right to object to this. As, indeed, the argument does not demonstrate for even one single particular way of making P or Q precise show that such a precise-ification of it is compatible with the government reaching the best results that a government can obtain.
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To answer your question: for something to count as ASI in a reasonable sense of ASI, then it must be, for some reasonable sense of “more intelligent”, more intelligent than any human.
If someone picked a sense of “more intelligent” that I considered reasonable, and demonstrated that having a computer program which is in that sense of “more intelligent” is more intelligent than all humans, isn’t incompatible with achieving the best possible outcomes, then I would say that, for a reasonable sense of “ASI”, they have demonstrated that there being an ASI is compatible with achieving the best possible outcome. (I might even say that they have demonstrated that, for that sense of ASI, that it is possible for an ASI to be aligned, though for that I think I might require that it be possible for the ASI (in that sense of ASI) to produce the outcome, not just be around at the same time.)
The problem with this is that people use the word “superintelligence” without a precise definition. Clearly they mean some computational process. But nobody who uses the term colloquially defines it.
So, I will make the assertion that if a computational process achieves the best possible outcome for you, it is a superintelligence. I don’t think anyone would disagree with that.
If you do, please state what other properties you think a “superintelligence” must have other than being a computational process achieves the best possible outcome.
If you are interested in convincing people who so far think “It is impossible for the existence of an artificial superintelligence to produce desirable outcomes” otherwise, you should have a meaning of “an aritifical superintelligence” in mind that is like what they mean by it.
If one suspects that it is impossible for an artificial superintelligence to produce desirable outcomes, then when one considers “among possible futures, the one(s) that have as good or better outcomes than any other possible future”, one would suppose that these perhaps are not ones that contain superintelligences. And, so, one would suppose that the computational process that achieves the best outcome, would perhaps not be a superintelligence.
To convince such a person otherwise, you would have to establish that some properties that they consider characteristic of something being a superintelligence (which would probably be something like “is more intelligent and competent than any human” for some specified sense of “intelligent”) is compatible with achieving good (or maximally good) outcomes.
If someone suspects that [insert name of some not-particularly-well-defined political ideology here] can’t ever lead to good outcomes, it would not convince them otherwise to go through the same argument except with “government procedure” or whatever in place of the actuators and such of the computer program, and say that:
, they would not find this compelling in the slightest! They would object that [insert aforementioned name of a not very well defined ideology] generally has properties P and Q, and that you haven’t established that the P or Q are compatible with achieving the best that a government can achieve.
This would still be the case if P and Q are somewhat fuzzy concepts without a clear consensus on how to make them precise.
And, they would be right to object to this. As, indeed, the argument does not demonstrate for even one single particular way of making P or Q precise show that such a precise-ification of it is compatible with the government reaching the best results that a government can obtain.
______
To answer your question: for something to count as ASI in a reasonable sense of ASI, then it must be, for some reasonable sense of “more intelligent”, more intelligent than any human.
If someone picked a sense of “more intelligent” that I considered reasonable, and demonstrated that having a computer program which is in that sense of “more intelligent” is more intelligent than all humans, isn’t incompatible with achieving the best possible outcomes, then I would say that, for a reasonable sense of “ASI”, they have demonstrated that there being an ASI is compatible with achieving the best possible outcome. (I might even say that they have demonstrated that, for that sense of ASI, that it is possible for an ASI to be aligned, though for that I think I might require that it be possible for the ASI (in that sense of ASI) to produce the outcome, not just be around at the same time.)