OK, so how else might we get people to gate-check the troublesome, philosophical, misleading parts of their moral intuitions that would have fewer undesirable side effects? I tend to agree with you that it’s good when people pause to reflect on consequences—but then when they evaluate those consequences I want them to just consult their gut feeling, as it were. Sooner or later the train of conscious reasoning had better dead-end in an intuitively held preference, or it’s spectacularly unlikely to fulfill anyone’s intuitively held preferences. (I, of course, intuitively prefer that such preferences be fulfilled.)
How do we prompt that kind of behavior? How can we get people to turn the logical brain on for consequentialism but off for normative ethics?
Am I to understand that you’re suggesting that we apply awesomeness to the consequences, and not the actions? Because that would be different from what I thought was being implied by saying “‘Awesome’ is implicitly consequentialist.” What I took that to mean is that, when one looks at an action, and decides whether or not it is awesome, the person is determining whether or not the consequences are something that they find desirable. That is distinct from looking at consequences and determining whether or not the consequences are awesome. That requires one to ALREADY be looking at things consequentially.
I think that, after thinking of things, when people use the term “awesome” they use it differently depending on how they view the world. If someone is already a consequentialist, that person will look at things consequentially when using the word awesome. If someone is already a dentologist, that person will look at the fulfillment of duties when using the word awesome. This is just a hypothesis, and I’m not very certain that it’s true, at the moment.
I’m not entirely sure how to prompt that sort of behavior, to be honest.
Because that would be different from what I thought was being implied by saying “‘Awesome’ is implicitly consequentialist.”
I meant that we should be looking at the awesomeness of outcomes and not actions, and that “awesome” is more effective at prompting this behavior than “good”. It looks like you get it, if I understand you correctly.
If someone is already a dentologist, that person will look at the fulfillment of duties when using the word awesome.
I find that somewhat implausible. If they are a hardcore explicit deontologist who,against the spirit of this article, has attempted to import their previous moral beliefs/confusions into their interpretation of “awesomism”, then yeah. For random folks who intuitively lean towards deontology for “good”, I think “awesome” is still going to be substantially more consequentialist. I would expect variation, though.
I wonder how you could test this. Maybe next year’s survey could have some scenarios that ask for an awesomeness ranking, and some other scenarios that ask for a goodness raking, and some more with a rightness ranking. Then we could see how people’s intuitions vary with whether they claim to be deontologist or consequentialist, and with prompting wording. This could put the claims in the OP here on a more solid footing than “this works for me”.
I meant that we should be looking at the awesomeness of outcomes and not actions, and that “awesome” is more effective at prompting this behavior than “good”. It looks like you get it, if I understand you correctly.
Oh! That does make sense. I can see your point with that.
I find that somewhat implausible. If they are a hardcore explicit deontologist who,against the spirit of this article, has attempted to import their previous moral beliefs/confusions into their interpretation of “awesomism”, then yeah. For random folks who intuitively lean towards deontology for “good”, I think “awesome” is still going to be substantially more consequentialist.
Possibly. I’m honestly not sure which hypothesis would be more correct, at the moment. Testing it would probably be a good idea, if we had the resources to do it. (Do we have the resources for that? I wouldn’t expect it, but weirder things have happened.)
Maybe next year’s survey could have some scenarios that ask for an awesomeness ranking, and some other scenarios that ask for a goodness raking, and some more with a rightness ranking. Then we could see how people’s intuitions vary with whether they claim to be deontologist or consequentialist, and with prompting wording. This could put the claims in the OP here on a more solid footing than “this works for me”.
I don’t think that would work. People here tend to be more consequentialist than I’ve seen from people not from here, so we’d probably not be able to see as much of a difference. Plus, the people here are hardly what I’d call normal and are more homogeneous than a more standard set of people. To effectively test that, we’d have to conduct that survey with a more random group of people. I mean, that survey would work, but the sample should be different than the contributors of LessWrong.
I don’t think that would work. People here tend to be more consequentialist than I’ve seen from people not from here, so we’d probably not be able to see as much of a difference. Plus, the people here are hardly what I’d call normal and are more homogeneous than a more standard set of people. To effectively test that, we’d have to conduct that survey with a more random group of people. I mean, that survey would work, but the sample should be different than the contributors of LessWrong.
If the number of deontologists isn’t big enough to power our inference, the stats should tell us this. There are some though.
And I think going outside LW is unnecessary. This essay is hardly aimed at people-in-general.
If the number of deontologists isn’t big enough to power our inference, the stats should tell us this. There are some though.
That’s true. Perhaps we could sort them by what their results with “good” show us about which normative ethical theory they follow, then compare the results of each of the groupings between “good” and “awesome”. That would show us the results without consequentialists acting as white noise.
And I think going outside LW is unnecessary. This essay is hardly aimed at people-in-general.
Good point, though it would be interesting to see if it could be applied to people outside of LW.
OK, so how else might we get people to gate-check the troublesome, philosophical, misleading parts of their moral intuitions that would have fewer undesirable side effects? I tend to agree with you that it’s good when people pause to reflect on consequences—but then when they evaluate those consequences I want them to just consult their gut feeling, as it were. Sooner or later the train of conscious reasoning had better dead-end in an intuitively held preference, or it’s spectacularly unlikely to fulfill anyone’s intuitively held preferences. (I, of course, intuitively prefer that such preferences be fulfilled.)
How do we prompt that kind of behavior? How can we get people to turn the logical brain on for consequentialism but off for normative ethics?
Am I to understand that you’re suggesting that we apply awesomeness to the consequences, and not the actions? Because that would be different from what I thought was being implied by saying “‘Awesome’ is implicitly consequentialist.” What I took that to mean is that, when one looks at an action, and decides whether or not it is awesome, the person is determining whether or not the consequences are something that they find desirable. That is distinct from looking at consequences and determining whether or not the consequences are awesome. That requires one to ALREADY be looking at things consequentially.
I think that, after thinking of things, when people use the term “awesome” they use it differently depending on how they view the world. If someone is already a consequentialist, that person will look at things consequentially when using the word awesome. If someone is already a dentologist, that person will look at the fulfillment of duties when using the word awesome. This is just a hypothesis, and I’m not very certain that it’s true, at the moment.
I’m not entirely sure how to prompt that sort of behavior, to be honest.
I meant that we should be looking at the awesomeness of outcomes and not actions, and that “awesome” is more effective at prompting this behavior than “good”. It looks like you get it, if I understand you correctly.
I find that somewhat implausible. If they are a hardcore explicit deontologist who,against the spirit of this article, has attempted to import their previous moral beliefs/confusions into their interpretation of “awesomism”, then yeah. For random folks who intuitively lean towards deontology for “good”, I think “awesome” is still going to be substantially more consequentialist. I would expect variation, though.
I wonder how you could test this. Maybe next year’s survey could have some scenarios that ask for an awesomeness ranking, and some other scenarios that ask for a goodness raking, and some more with a rightness ranking. Then we could see how people’s intuitions vary with whether they claim to be deontologist or consequentialist, and with prompting wording. This could put the claims in the OP here on a more solid footing than “this works for me”.
Oh! That does make sense. I can see your point with that.
Possibly. I’m honestly not sure which hypothesis would be more correct, at the moment. Testing it would probably be a good idea, if we had the resources to do it. (Do we have the resources for that? I wouldn’t expect it, but weirder things have happened.)
I don’t think that would work. People here tend to be more consequentialist than I’ve seen from people not from here, so we’d probably not be able to see as much of a difference. Plus, the people here are hardly what I’d call normal and are more homogeneous than a more standard set of people. To effectively test that, we’d have to conduct that survey with a more random group of people. I mean, that survey would work, but the sample should be different than the contributors of LessWrong.
If the number of deontologists isn’t big enough to power our inference, the stats should tell us this. There are some though.
And I think going outside LW is unnecessary. This essay is hardly aimed at people-in-general.
That’s true. Perhaps we could sort them by what their results with “good” show us about which normative ethical theory they follow, then compare the results of each of the groupings between “good” and “awesome”. That would show us the results without consequentialists acting as white noise.
Good point, though it would be interesting to see if it could be applied to people outside of LW.