I think the point is that in PD symmetry+precommitment ⇒ cooperation, and asymmetry + precommitment = symmetry (this is the “trivial fix”), so asymmetry + precommitment ⇒ cooperation.
Kinda. Benja pointed out the asymmetry + precommitment = symmetry part; I pointed out the symmetry + precommitment part. It just seems that precommitment + free trade makes all sorts of problems rather easy. Not all, of course—just who do you precommit to equalizing with, say, and of course how do you calibrate your relative utilities.
...so? What you say is true but seems entirely irrelevant to the question what the superrational outcome in an asymmetric game should be.
I think the point is that in PD symmetry+precommitment ⇒ cooperation, and asymmetry + precommitment = symmetry (this is the “trivial fix”), so asymmetry + precommitment ⇒ cooperation.
Kinda. Benja pointed out the asymmetry + precommitment = symmetry part; I pointed out the symmetry + precommitment part. It just seems that precommitment + free trade makes all sorts of problems rather easy. Not all, of course—just who do you precommit to equalizing with, say, and of course how do you calibrate your relative utilities.