However, you can flip this over trivially and come to a terrible conclusion. If Duplication is true, you merely
have to simulate a person until they experience a moment of pure hedonic bliss, in some ethically correct
manner that everyone agrees is morally good to experience and enjoy. Then, copy the fragment of the simulation
covering the experiencing of that emotion, and duplicate it endlessly.
True just if your summum bonum is exactly an aggregate of moments of happiness experienced.
I take the position that it is not.
I don’t think one even has to resort to a position like “only one copy counts”.
True, but that’s then striking more at the heart of Bostrom’s argument, rather than my counter-argument, which was just flipping Bostrom around. (Unless your summum malum is significantly different, such that duplicate tortures and duplicate good-things-equivalent-to-torture-in-emotional-effect still sum differently?)
True just if your summum bonum is exactly an aggregate of moments of happiness experienced.
I take the position that it is not.
I don’t think one even has to resort to a position like “only one copy counts”.
True, but that’s then striking more at the heart of Bostrom’s argument, rather than my counter-argument, which was just flipping Bostrom around. (Unless your summum malum is significantly different, such that duplicate tortures and duplicate good-things-equivalent-to-torture-in-emotional-effect still sum differently?)