I didn’t think your comments were very relevant to the paper as I can see little about politics in it.
Yet in actuality, this is an extremely dangerous goal. If you set out to use your power and ability to force everyone to agree with you, then it seems far more likely that you’ll end up with a dictatorship where people hide their true beliefs out of fear, than a situation where everyone is truly convinced.
And what power or force is that? Actually autocratic leaders have weapons, a monopoly on physical force. Chalmers is using words. “Weaponised terminology” is still terminology, not weapons—despite the misleading impression the (engineered) term creates.
″....homonymous engineering can also be extremely difficult to implement, unless one is very powerful or very lucky, or in a small community...”
So Chalmers doesn’t see himself as a dictator who can impose his will. And why should be? Other people can use the same “weapons” to oppose him. He doesn’t have a monopoly on power.
Chalmers, or whoever else wants to re engineer a concept has to win out in the marketplace of ideas , and that’s the exact opposite of authoritarianism.
Chalmers is able to decide for us what definitions are better than the ones we are already using, the only real problem is that he can’t make us use his definitions.
Everyone thinks their stuff is best, and tries to push it. That’s what youve been doing.
When introducing the evaluation stage, the paper only mentions ethics as a way to evaluate concepts: “And then there’s the evaluation stage, which plays a central role in the conceptual ethics work by people like Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett.”
The idea that things should be evaluated first and foremost by ethics, rather than by other means, is central to the Social Justice ideology, and is extremely political. For example, papers have been removed from journals because some people consider the findings to be unethical, rather than wrong, which is a completely different standard than was used in traditional science. The examples he gives of how to evaluate concepts are mostly drawn from SJ:
“Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice and its varieties like testimonial and hermeneutic injustice, would be a paradigmatic example here of drawing out a fruitful concept. Sally Haslanger’s work on gender and race is another. A key example would be her work towards the analysis of the concept of woman in terms of oppression. What Haslanger calls ameliorative analysis is conceptual engineering in the revisionary mode to serve various ends, including the ends of social justice. This ameliorative strand of conceptual engineering has been picked up by many other people in recent social philosophy. Kate Manne’s revisionary analysis of misogyny is an example.”
None of these are apolitical examples.
And what power or force is that? Actually autocratic leaders have weapons, a monopoly on physical force. Chalmers is using words.
I’m not claiming that this paper is a weapon, but rather that it’s an apologia for weaponizing concepts.
″....homonymous engineering can also be extremely difficult to implement, unless one is very powerful or very lucky, or in a small community...”
So Chalmers doesn’t see himself as a dictator who can impose his will.
That’s not what the quote that you give says, so you are misrepresenting his words. He actually says that one kind of conceptual engineering can be extremely difficult in some circumstances. You falsely translate that into a claim that it is impossible, which Chalmers doesn’t even claim for the specific situations that he considers more difficult than other situations, let alone in general.
In the conclusions of the paper, he states that: “Concept design and concept evaluation are relatively tractable, but widespread concept implementation is a difficult social project. As a result, conceptual engineering on a community-wide scale is difficult, but it is possible.”
Chalmers describes this kind of social engineering as being desirable. The difference between a classical liberal and an authoritarian is that the former doesn’t sees a lack of control over the behavior of others as desirable, while the latter sees it as a problem to be solved. Chalmers is the latter.
Everyone thinks their stuff is best, and tries to push it. That’s what you’ve been doing.
My criticism of Chalmers is not that he is trying to convince others, in which case your criticism would be correct, but that he wants to find way to control others.
Perhaps you don’t understand the difference between trying to convince people and trying to control people?
My criticism of Chalmers is not that he is trying to convince others, in which case your criticism would be correct, but that he wants to find way to control others.
Perhaps you don’t understand the difference between trying to convince people and trying to control people?
I fully understand it. The thing is that you have not made the case for control over conviction, as something that is literally true. All your arguments are based on loaded language.
I’m not claiming that this paper is a weapon, but rather that it’s an apologia for weaponizing concepts.
“Weaponised concept” is a misleading metaphor.
In the conclusions of the paper, he states that: “Concept design and concept evaluation are relatively tractable, but widespread concept implementation is a difficult social project. As a result, conceptual engineering on a community-wide scale is difficult, but it is possible.”
Chalmers describes this kind of social engineering as being desirable
Chalmers doesn’t use the term “social engineering”. Your argument is a slippery slope from “conceptual engineering” to “social engineering” to “control”.
None of these are apolitical examples
I said “little” , not “none”.
The idea that things should be evaluated first and foremost by ethics, rather than by other means, is central to the Social Justice ideology,
And the Christian, Buddhist , Muslim.....ideologies. “Evaluate things ethically” is not an extraordinary claim. Even classical liberalism holds that you should evaluate things and foremost by their impact on freedom, which is an ethical argument.
The thing is that you have not made the case for control over conviction, as something that is literally true.
I’m not sure how one could ever prove that, in the absence of hindsight and perhaps not even then. Many people didn’t expect Hitler to prosecute the Jews, despite what he wrote in Mein Kampf, so as far as I can tell, even that book doesn’t meet your standard of proving that Hitler wanted to prosecute the Jews in a way that is “literally true.”
Of course, you can choose to always err in favor of petting animals unless that specific animal has already harmed someone, but that policy is only feasible in an environment with very few (very) dangerous animals. Your policy is not suitable to other environments.
Anyway, my claim is based on large part on the total absence of recognition in the paper that there is any potential problem with seeking to control others and instead, his claim that the only problem is that making people use your concepts is very difficult. Then there is his approval of highly problematic and extremist social justice advocates, without giving any competing political examples, which makes it highly likely that he has extremist politics himself, based in the rather simply logic that people tend to quote and approve of things they believe in themselves.
But it doesn’t really matter what he believes, because the paper is an apologia for being so one-sided, in particular in the current political climate. It is pushing an open door.
I said “little” , not “none”.
Yet I was easily able to find a paragraph with him approving of three different extremely political and polarizing examples, which he chose to use instead of neutral examples. When a very high percentage of the examples is political, that is not “little.”
And the Christian, Buddhist , Muslim.....ideologies. “Evaluate things ethically” is not an extraordinary claim.
It is/was actually crucial for human development and peace that religions are/were liberalized. For example, the Peace of Westphalia liberalized Christianity in Europe, requiring believers to stop acting on their belief that only faith in their religion would ensure eternal salvation, which they considered justification for extreme warmongering.
And that something is not an “extraordinary claim,” doesn’t mean that it is not extremely harmful or that it can’t lead to extraordinary outcomes. Hitler’s antisemitism wasn’t extraordinary, but the final solution outcome was extraordinary. However, even fairly common outcomes can be quite bad.
Even classical liberalism holds that you should evaluate things and foremost by their impact on freedom, which is an ethical argument.
You are again failing to distinguish the object level and the meta-level. Setting global rules that allow individuals to fairly freely make their decisions based on their own ethics is fundamentally different from desiring/demanding that each of those decisions is tightly controlled directly or indirectly by a global set of ethical rules.
I didn’t think your comments were very relevant to the paper as I can see little about politics in it.
And what power or force is that? Actually autocratic leaders have weapons, a monopoly on physical force. Chalmers is using words. “Weaponised terminology” is still terminology, not weapons—despite the misleading impression the (engineered) term creates.
So Chalmers doesn’t see himself as a dictator who can impose his will. And why should be? Other people can use the same “weapons” to oppose him. He doesn’t have a monopoly on power.
Chalmers, or whoever else wants to re engineer a concept has to win out in the marketplace of ideas , and that’s the exact opposite of authoritarianism.
Everyone thinks their stuff is best, and tries to push it. That’s what youve been doing.
When introducing the evaluation stage, the paper only mentions ethics as a way to evaluate concepts: “And then there’s the evaluation stage, which plays a central role in the conceptual ethics work by people like Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett.”
The idea that things should be evaluated first and foremost by ethics, rather than by other means, is central to the Social Justice ideology, and is extremely political. For example, papers have been removed from journals because some people consider the findings to be unethical, rather than wrong, which is a completely different standard than was used in traditional science. The examples he gives of how to evaluate concepts are mostly drawn from SJ:
“Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice and its varieties like testimonial and hermeneutic injustice, would be a paradigmatic example here of drawing out a fruitful concept. Sally Haslanger’s work on gender and race is another. A key example would be her work towards the analysis of the concept of woman in terms of oppression. What Haslanger calls ameliorative analysis is conceptual engineering in the revisionary mode to serve various ends, including the ends of social justice. This ameliorative strand of conceptual engineering has been picked up by many other people in recent social philosophy. Kate Manne’s revisionary analysis of misogyny is an example.”
None of these are apolitical examples.
I’m not claiming that this paper is a weapon, but rather that it’s an apologia for weaponizing concepts.
That’s not what the quote that you give says, so you are misrepresenting his words. He actually says that one kind of conceptual engineering can be extremely difficult in some circumstances. You falsely translate that into a claim that it is impossible, which Chalmers doesn’t even claim for the specific situations that he considers more difficult than other situations, let alone in general.
In the conclusions of the paper, he states that: “Concept design and concept evaluation are relatively tractable, but widespread concept implementation is a difficult social project. As a result, conceptual engineering on a community-wide scale is difficult, but it is possible.”
Chalmers describes this kind of social engineering as being desirable. The difference between a classical liberal and an authoritarian is that the former doesn’t sees a lack of control over the behavior of others as desirable, while the latter sees it as a problem to be solved. Chalmers is the latter.
My criticism of Chalmers is not that he is trying to convince others, in which case your criticism would be correct, but that he wants to find way to control others.
Perhaps you don’t understand the difference between trying to convince people and trying to control people?
I fully understand it. The thing is that you have not made the case for control over conviction, as something that is literally true. All your arguments are based on loaded language.
“Weaponised concept” is a misleading metaphor.
Chalmers doesn’t use the term “social engineering”. Your argument is a slippery slope from “conceptual engineering” to “social engineering” to “control”.
I said “little” , not “none”.
And the Christian, Buddhist , Muslim.....ideologies. “Evaluate things ethically” is not an extraordinary claim. Even classical liberalism holds that you should evaluate things and foremost by their impact on freedom, which is an ethical argument.
I’m not sure how one could ever prove that, in the absence of hindsight and perhaps not even then. Many people didn’t expect Hitler to prosecute the Jews, despite what he wrote in Mein Kampf, so as far as I can tell, even that book doesn’t meet your standard of proving that Hitler wanted to prosecute the Jews in a way that is “literally true.”
Of course, you can choose to always err in favor of petting animals unless that specific animal has already harmed someone, but that policy is only feasible in an environment with very few (very) dangerous animals. Your policy is not suitable to other environments.
Anyway, my claim is based on large part on the total absence of recognition in the paper that there is any potential problem with seeking to control others and instead, his claim that the only problem is that making people use your concepts is very difficult. Then there is his approval of highly problematic and extremist social justice advocates, without giving any competing political examples, which makes it highly likely that he has extremist politics himself, based in the rather simply logic that people tend to quote and approve of things they believe in themselves.
But it doesn’t really matter what he believes, because the paper is an apologia for being so one-sided, in particular in the current political climate. It is pushing an open door.
Yet I was easily able to find a paragraph with him approving of three different extremely political and polarizing examples, which he chose to use instead of neutral examples. When a very high percentage of the examples is political, that is not “little.”
It is/was actually crucial for human development and peace that religions are/were liberalized. For example, the Peace of Westphalia liberalized Christianity in Europe, requiring believers to stop acting on their belief that only faith in their religion would ensure eternal salvation, which they considered justification for extreme warmongering.
And that something is not an “extraordinary claim,” doesn’t mean that it is not extremely harmful or that it can’t lead to extraordinary outcomes. Hitler’s antisemitism wasn’t extraordinary, but the final
solutionoutcome was extraordinary. However, even fairly common outcomes can be quite bad.You are again failing to distinguish the object level and the meta-level. Setting global rules that allow individuals to fairly freely make their decisions based on their own ethics is fundamentally different from desiring/demanding that each of those decisions is tightly controlled directly or indirectly by a global set of ethical rules.