Nice point. Yeah, that sounds right to me—I definitely think there are things in the vicinity and types of “rationalization” that are NOT rational. The class of cases you’re pointing to seems like a common type, and I think you’re right that I should just restrict attention. “Preference rationalization” sounds like it might get the scope right.
Sometimes people use “rationalization” to by definition be irrational—like “that’s not a real reason, that’s just a rationalization”. And it sounds like the cases you have in mind fit that mold.
I hadn’t thought as much about the cross of this with the ethical version of the case. Of course, something can be (practically or epistemically) rational without being moral, so there are some versions of those cases that I’d still insist ARE rational even if we don’t like how the agent acts.
Nice point. Yeah, that sounds right to me—I definitely think there are things in the vicinity and types of “rationalization” that are NOT rational. The class of cases you’re pointing to seems like a common type, and I think you’re right that I should just restrict attention. “Preference rationalization” sounds like it might get the scope right.
Sometimes people use “rationalization” to by definition be irrational—like “that’s not a real reason, that’s just a rationalization”. And it sounds like the cases you have in mind fit that mold.
I hadn’t thought as much about the cross of this with the ethical version of the case. Of course, something can be (practically or epistemically) rational without being moral, so there are some versions of those cases that I’d still insist ARE rational even if we don’t like how the agent acts.