I do think there is a good deal of commonality among the reasonable comments about what emergence is and also feel the force of Eliezer’s request for negative examples.
I’ll try to summarize (and of course over-simplify).
When we have a large collection of interacting elements, and we can measure a property of the collection as a whole, in some cases we’d like to call that property emergent, and in some cases we wouldn’t.
I can think of three important cases:
If we can compute the property as a simple sum or average of properties of the individual elements, then it is not emergent. So e.g. mass or temperature are not emergent properties.
If we need to analyze long chains of structurally specific causal interactions to explain the coarser grained property, then it is not emergent. So e.g. the time telling properties of a mechanical clock, or the arithmetic computing properties of a calculator are not emergent.
If we can compute the property as a function of the properties of the elements, and it depends sensitively on specific characteristics of their behavior and interaction, but is robust under local perturbations (i.e. doesn’t depend on structurally specific causal chains), then the property is emergent. So e.g. percolation is emergent. Also we have some warrant to say that flocking, thinking (as brains do it), social interaction, etc. are emergent.
I’m not claiming these three cases cover all the legitimate positive and negative examples of emergence—I don’t think the concept has crystallized that completely yet. But I do think they answer Eliezer’s challenge.
Another, less crisply defined question is whether we should be using “emergence” so defined, and relatedly, whether people are mostly trying to use it in this sense, or whether they are, as Eliezer fears, just using it as a synonym for “magic”.
My own feeling is that many users of the term are groping for a clear definition of this general sort, and that they are doing so precisely to avoid having to explain a large class of phenomena by “magic”.
I do think there is a good deal of commonality among the reasonable comments about what emergence is and also feel the force of Eliezer’s request for negative examples.
I’ll try to summarize (and of course over-simplify).
When we have a large collection of interacting elements, and we can measure a property of the collection as a whole, in some cases we’d like to call that property emergent, and in some cases we wouldn’t.
I can think of three important cases:
If we can compute the property as a simple sum or average of properties of the individual elements, then it is not emergent. So e.g. mass or temperature are not emergent properties.
If we need to analyze long chains of structurally specific causal interactions to explain the coarser grained property, then it is not emergent. So e.g. the time telling properties of a mechanical clock, or the arithmetic computing properties of a calculator are not emergent.
If we can compute the property as a function of the properties of the elements, and it depends sensitively on specific characteristics of their behavior and interaction, but is robust under local perturbations (i.e. doesn’t depend on structurally specific causal chains), then the property is emergent. So e.g. percolation is emergent. Also we have some warrant to say that flocking, thinking (as brains do it), social interaction, etc. are emergent.
I’m not claiming these three cases cover all the legitimate positive and negative examples of emergence—I don’t think the concept has crystallized that completely yet. But I do think they answer Eliezer’s challenge.
Another, less crisply defined question is whether we should be using “emergence” so defined, and relatedly, whether people are mostly trying to use it in this sense, or whether they are, as Eliezer fears, just using it as a synonym for “magic”.
My own feeling is that many users of the term are groping for a clear definition of this general sort, and that they are doing so precisely to avoid having to explain a large class of phenomena by “magic”.