This comment doesn’t seem to sufficiently engage with (what I saw as) the core question Rob was asking (and which I would ask), which was:
I personally care about things other than suffering. What are negative utilitarians saying about that?
Are they saying that they don’t care about things like friendship, good food, joy, catharsis, adventure, learning new things, falling in love, etc., except as mechanisms for avoiding suffering? Are they saying that I’m deluded about having preferences like those? Are they saying that I should try to change my preferences — and if so, why?
You briefly note “you may be overly attached to them”, but this doesn’t give any arguments for why I might be overly attached to them, instead of attached to them the correct amount.
When you ask:
To actually reject NU, you must explain what makes something (other than suffering) terminally valuable (or as I say, motivating) beyond its instrumental value for helping us prevent suffering in the total context.
My response is “to reject NU, all I have to do is terminally care about anything other than suffering. I care about things other than suffering, ergo NU must be false, and the burden is on other people to explain what is wrong with my preferences.”
This comment doesn’t seem to sufficiently engage with (what I saw as) the core question Rob was asking (and which I would ask), which was:
You briefly note “you may be overly attached to them”, but this doesn’t give any arguments for why I might be overly attached to them, instead of attached to them the correct amount.
When you ask:
My response is “to reject NU, all I have to do is terminally care about anything other than suffering. I care about things other than suffering, ergo NU must be false, and the burden is on other people to explain what is wrong with my preferences.”