I do not think we need to go as far as i-zombies. We can take two people, show them the same object under arbitrarily close conditions, and get the answer of ‘green’ out of both of them while one does not experience green on account of being color-blind.
(Surely not that qualia are nonphysical, which is the moral Chalmers draws from thinking about p-zombies; colour-blindness involves identifiable physical differences.)
I do not think we need to go as far as i-zombies. We can take two people, show them the same object under arbitrarily close conditions, and get the answer of ‘green’ out of both of them while one does not experience green on account of being color-blind.
What do you infer from being able to do this?
(Surely not that qualia are nonphysical, which is the moral Chalmers draws from thinking about p-zombies; colour-blindness involves identifiable physical differences.)
This gives us these options under the Chalmers scheme:
Same input → same output & same qualia
Same input → same output & different qualia
Same input → same output & no qualia
I infer the ineffable green-ness of green is not even wrong. We have no grounds for thinking there is such a thing.