It’s a life and death matter: if the upload won’t be ikrase, then he will be killed in the process of uploading. Naturally he doesn’t care as much about whether or not a new person will be created than whether he will continue to exist.
If I am killed in the process of uploading (thus creating an immortal child of my mind), that is far, far, far, better than dying utterly, but not as good as continuous consciousness. In particular, most uploading techniques seem like they would allow the unlimited duplication of people and would not necessarily destroy the original, which worries me. (Hanson cites this as an advantage of the em-verse, which convinces me of his immorality). However, I am not yet convinced that I would be willing to casually upload.
It’s a life and death matter: if the upload won’t be ikrase, then he will be killed in the process of uploading. Naturally he doesn’t care as much about whether or not a new person will be created than whether he will continue to exist.
If I am killed in the process of uploading (thus creating an immortal child of my mind), that is far, far, far, better than dying utterly, but not as good as continuous consciousness. In particular, most uploading techniques seem like they would allow the unlimited duplication of people and would not necessarily destroy the original, which worries me. (Hanson cites this as an advantage of the em-verse, which convinces me of his immorality). However, I am not yet convinced that I would be willing to casually upload.